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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The relationship of South America to the United States of America has been
one of disparity with South America assumed to be subservient to the dominion,
power, and interests of the U.S. and its perceived sphere of influence. While true,
as long as these dynamics have existed, they have been contested by South
America and its allies abroad. This South American struggle towards political
autonomy from its North American counterparts has not only been evident since
their liberation from Spanish domination but also crosses all political spectrums. Of
course, this regional struggle towards sovereignty in all its affairs has always been
fraught with difficulties, obstacles, and impasses and thus uneven to seeming
impossible at its most extreme.
What are the examples of political autonomy or subordination in South
America? In the course of this thesis, I will show the oscillations of political
autonomy and subordination. While the results of my research have been as varied
as I describe above, what I can say is that autonomy is something that some South
American countries want, struggle for, and sometimes obtain. At the same time,
other governments are content to go down the much easier road of subservience to
U.S. demands and interests.
Have there been instances in South American history that we can show that
South American sovereignty and the historic sway of the United States has
appreciably changed to a more politically autonomous condition? Can regional
organizations or some other sources facilitate and engineer South American elites’
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search for regional autonomy (a.k.a. “imagined unity”1) and solidarity as an
alternative to what Henry Michael Erisman and Norman Girvan refer to as
“Washington’s NeoPanAmerican2 agenda” and more broadly subservience to
hegemony3/neo-imperialism (Erisman and Girvan, 2013: 255)? As we shall soon
see throughout the trials, tribulations, and more recently, political oscillations seen
throughout South and Latin America is nothing if not consistently tumultuous. Olivier
Dabene defines the regional integration of Latin America as “characterized by a
succession of waves4 that saw the signing of several agreements launching or
reactivating several distinct integration processes” (Dabene 2012, 3).
I am very interested in uncovering if regional initiatives are creating this
counter-hegemonic political space by providing another fulcrum for shifting the
balance of power in the United States (U.S.) and Latin American dynamic from
traditional America’s backyard to something along this IR continuum more
approaching parity, reproducing the subordination to the “Washington Consensus,”

1

“Going back further in history, we would see that the reference to an imagined united Latin America has
been recurrent ever since the continent gained its independence…” (Dabene 2009, 3).
2
Also known as the “Washington Consensus,” which is the imposition of ostensibly “liberal-democratic politics
going hand in hand with neo-liberal economics “ (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 1). The notion of
subordination and/or subservience will also be used interchangeably. Due to the involvement of the “Miamibased Cuban-American community” and principal among them within and outside of the American
government, policymaker, lobbyist, etc. Otto Reich in recent times this has also been labeled as the “Miami
Consensus” (Puryear and Blackmon, 2018; Youngers, 2003).
3
I refer to hegemony and counter-hegemony many times throughout this thesis in the Gramscian political
sense and comprehensively defined by Thomas Muhr: “as the supremacy of a social group, which manifests
itself in economic, intellectual, political and moral leadership, to which the subalterns give their active
consent, while coercion is used only exceptionally as a disciplinary measure,” the consensual element in
hegemony, i.e. the ‘acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world that belongs to the rulers,’ which
appears as ‘common sense,’ mystifies the power relations upon which the order rests.” Muhr continues on to
write that “despite the current global crisis, neoliberalism remains the ideological common sense, counterhegemony requires offering ‘new understandings and practices capable of replacing the dominant ones’ while
‘building up the sociopolitical base for change through the creation of new historic blocs’” (Muhr, 2013: 2).
4
“If by wave, we mean a historical sequence during which a similar evolution takes place simultaneously in a
given set of countries, then Latin America has gone through four waves of regional integration, weaving a
complex patchwork quilt” (Dabene 2012, 3).
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or something else. I will seek to arrive at conclusions by studying the United States
and South American international relations and dynamics (e.g., perceived U.S.
international allies and enemies or influence of these allies-enemies in the region
whether real or perceived), and U.S. support and policymaking towards Latin
America (e.g., “Plan Colombia,” “counter-terrorism,” etc.)
Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz (2013: 6-7) delineate three common elements
of Latin American integrationist initiatives after the initial wresting of “independence”
from Spain: autonomy, “economic and social development,” and finally the “idea of a
common cultural identity.” I broadly agree with Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz’s
framing and defining of autonomy as well as their “three common elements”
throughout this thesis. However, I find that the politics of the first element that they
identify, the question of autonomy, underlie any discussion of political, social, or
cultural formation.
Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz (2013: 6-7) define autonomy as the “aiming to
transcend the subordination of Latin American countries vis-à-vis the major powers
of the international system, and the region’s limited bargaining power in the
international system.” Or, in other words, “to secure sovereignty from colonial
powers and preserve it from outside intervention,” and in this, these regional bodies
have “made important contributions to regional order,” reasserting their counterhegemonic political autonomy (Acharya, 2014: 96-97). Taking more of a geopolitical
perspective, it is also obvious that the nations of Latin America as “mostly small or
middle-sized powers in a region at the margins of major conflicts in world
politics…put a premium on a regulated international order that might protect the
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interests of smaller nations, rather than leaving them at the mercy of the great
powers” (Heine, 2012: 212). And finally, the “emergence of ‘groups’ or ‘bloc politics’
working within and without the UN, as well as formal and informal gatherings of
regional states…has enabled otherwise weak states to exercise influence” in
national sovereignty, international affairs, domestic interests, etc. (Alden, Morphet,
and Antonio, 2010: 8).
Autonomous regional political organizations have embodied aspirations of
many people throughout Latin America to politically and economically integrate the
region at least since the “beginning of the [eighteenth or] nineteenth century”
(Dabene 2009: 3). My thesis thus explores how these organizations serve as
“norms leaders,” “reinforc[ing] norms on [regional] sovereignty and non-intervention”
(Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 5). Further, these groups have “been able to
consolidate, quite remarkably, a democratic process of stability and reduction of
inequalities” within the region particularly considering the “well-known history of
political [in]stability, inequality, and [under]development in the region” (Vivares 2014:
1). Finally, beyond stabilizing and reducing inequalities within Latin America brought
on by the underdevelopment foisted on them by the U.S. and other Great Powers of
old, autonomous regional organizations of Latin America may be changing the
traditional balance of power and at the same time offering an example outside the
understanding of conventional IR theory to date.
As “norms leaders,” regional organizations have encouraged integrationist
norms that prioritize the autonomy mentioned by Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz as
one of the three key elements of “integrationist initiatives” in post-independence

6|P age

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

Latin America (2013: 6-7). Thomas Muir also refers to these counter-hegemonic
integrationist initiatives by using terms such as decolonialist, counter-imperialist, and
all through “South-South cooperation” (Muhr 2014: 11). I am interested in these
kinds of liberationist projects over the United States dominated consolidating
initiatives as with the Organization of American States (OAS). I will argue that late
twentieth and early twenty-first-century regional organizations that struggle for
greater autonomy mark a break in the history of Latin American integration, including
NeoPanAmerican efforts. More specifically, Vivares argues that what he calls the
“new South American regionalism” as the “more effective regional tool” for defending
“democratic political stability, instead [emphasis added] of the OAS” (Vivares 2014:
2).
I will attempt to show how we can understand why organizations such as the
OAS are viewed by many throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and outside
as subservient to U.S. demands by a brief background. The history of the OAS is
one fraught by at the very least heavy-handed influence, and at the very most,
outright puppetry by U.S. power.
The history of the OAS during the Cold War and since is not an auspicious
one. The OAS from its very inception in 1881, and again in mid-1888, was a U.S.
creation of former U.S. Secretary of State James Blaine, whose antipathy and a
patronizing attitude towards Latin America was evident and further shown by the
shifting invitations of the U.S. Congress, functionaries like Blaine, and former
American President Cleveland (Schoultz 1998: 283). Indeed, the first official
announcement of the upcoming emergent conference of states “had shifted from the
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prevention of war to the promotion of trade” and during the opening session there
was the U.S. declared “six-week recess so delegates could board an excursion train
for a 6,000 –mile trip from factory to factory across the Northeast and Midwest”
(ibid). Just as in the case of many other significant institutions in the world today like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the OAS was not only a U.S. instrument from
its beginnings but it was also symbolically and literally “lodged within the U.S.
Department of State” in its initial years, and a “U.S. citizen always served as the
director, and the secretary of state always chaired the Governing Board, which
determined the timing and the agenda of future meetings” at least for a good part of
its history (ibid).
Reverting to its ostensible purpose later after its rebirth as the OAS in 1948,
the duties of the OAS include, “promoting peaceful settlement of disputes, displaying
inter-American solidarity during periods of conflict, and promoting democracy
throughout the Americas” (Doleac 2015). However, its stated hopeful intentions
aside, the implementation of these laudable purposes were far from true to intention,
and even the rare times when applied, this application was selective bordering on
the absurd. The list of OAS exceptions and contradictions is long, but include
among them refusing to “fulfill these duties when the US government installed and
supported strongman regimes throughout the Americas” such as the Pinochet
regime in Chile, “when the United Kingdom and Argentina clashed over the
Falklands/Malouines islands, in 1982” and finally in the illegal (i.e., per OAS rules)
exclusion of Cuba and no implementation related to the U.S. led Bay of Pigs
invasion (Doleac 2015). Fairer (i.e., towards all member states) and more regular
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application of rules within the OAS only began around the 1990s and especially after
the first truly democratic (i.e., not completely U.S. “pre-approved”) selection of OAS
Secretary General in 2004 (ibid).
In recent years, “questioning the legitimacy” of the OAS especially for its
“[mis]management” of the crisis surrounding the Honduran coup d'état in 2009,
during which the USA played a lukewarm role as the protagonist in defense of
democracy” has been a very popular tactic to signify a leader’s “anti-imperialist”
credentials and simultaneously the bankruptcy of the OAS and its slow eclipsing by
more autonomous organizations of Latin America such as UNASUR5 (Spanish:
Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR or English translation: Union of South
American Nations) and ALBA-TCP Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA or ALBA-TCP) (Vivares 2014: 200-201). As other authors have
written, the OAS “has been frequently criticized for kowtowing to Washington” (De
La Barra and Dello Buono, 2012: 32-33). Current President of Cuba only reinforced
the bankrupt reputation of the OAS within most of Latin America when he recently
repudiated any possibility of Cuba rejoining the OAS in “solidarity” with ideological,
diplomatic, etc. ally Venezuela currently being verbally and procedurally attacked by
the Secretary-General Luis Almargo and called the OAS “an instrument of imperialist
domination” (BBC News – Cuba Will, 2016).
The steadily declining reputation of the O.A.S. took another precipitous drop
in its intervention in the Bolivian election of 2019, which helped to steer the country
towards a right-wing coup, which removed elected President Evo Morales from

5

As of 2016, UNASUR included the member countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela (UNASUR, 2016).
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power. In response to protests against the October 20, 2019 election, and an initial
statement of concerns about the vote that the O.A.S. stated, President Morales
invited in the O.A.S. to audit the final vote results (teleSUR, 2019; Wilgress, 2019).
As we should already understand after this brief historical review of the O.A.S., this
was his first mistake. Expectedly, in short order, the O.A.S. claimed that the vote
contained irregularities, which consequently added fuel to the fire of protests, media
vituperation, and world powers pressure (Wilgress, 2019).
Again expectedly, after all of this coordinated violence (i.e., physical, mental,
etc.) against the reelection of President Morales led to the ‘recommendation’ of
Bolivia's Armed Forces Commander Williams Kaliman on November 10, 2019 “to
present his resignation” the O.A.S.’s various statements, reports, etc. about “fraud”
during the election were all found by multiple studies to be without any evidence
whatsoever and in fact found that it was “very likely” that President Morales had won
his reelection in the first round (Beeton, 2020; teleSUR, 2019; Wilgress, 2019).
Ironically, the interventions and effects that the O.A.S. had on this entire affair
reinforce and add documentation to my argued hypothesis on how a regional
organization might exercise power (in this way being hegemonic). Without the
intervention of the O.A.S., it is debatable if the protests against Morales, the
governmental opposition in cities and regions of the country historically hotbeds of
oligarchic hostility towards Morales, etc. would have had the same staying power not
to mention a friendly hegemon in the U.S. that was very intent on removing Morales
from power (thus the O.A.S. acting as an agent of the reigning hegemon). It cannot
also be overstated that without President Morales rapidly surrendering
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national/electoral sovereignty to the O.A.S. and the mostly middle and upper-class
protesters, thus opening Pandora’s Box, it is more likely than not that Morales would
still be president at this time.
In a similar way that President Morales of Bolivia essentially abdicated his
position by inviting in the O.A.S. to audit the election, small states can exercise their
power or choose not to. Hegemony over Latin America is a ripped net with many
opportunities for shrewd policymakers of small states6 to resist the demands of
strong states or to at least negotiate the terms of their cooperation.
One scholar, Tom Long, writes that “small states’ leaders might more
effectively achieve their goals through either confrontation or some degree of
cooperation” and that how they respond might “shape the behaviors of great powers”
(Long, 2017: 15, 21). Tom Long writes that because small states do not have
access to “traditional forms of power,” “they must specialize in how they employ their
resources and relationships” and breaks down the types of available power as
“particular-intrinsic, derivative, and collective power” (Long, June 2017: 186-187).
Long defines these three types of small state powers with particular-intrinsic
being the first as small states “resources [which] are a potential base of power, but
these resources (less so than a tremendous military) only become salient in world
politics through their exercise” (Long, June 2017: 194-195). The second type of
small state powers defined is that of derivative power which says that small states
“[l]acking significant material capabilities of their own […] may derive power by

6

Most of the countries of Latin American could be defined as small states though a definition for this paper
would not be possible with the contested nature of the definition. What we can say is that what we call small
states do take place along a continuum.
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convincing larger states to take actions that boost their interests” (Long, June 2017:
196). Long’s third and final small state power he calls “the fundamental base of
collective power is the relationship between a small state and associated non-great
powers” (Long, June 2017: 198).
One of the most interesting of this new taxonomy of small state powers
proposed by Long is that of collective power. For our purposes, further showing how
collective power works in the regional organizational context might be useful and
illuminating. Long writes that “small states’ collective power can work in different
ways: through dedicated institutionalism, via single-issue groupings, or to leverage
allies for one state’s cause” (Long, June 2017: 198). I hope that future research
takes into account regional organizations such as those I have focused on
throughout this paper.
It is important to emphasize here that hegemony practiced by the developed
world against that of the global South is not all-encompassing and omniscient.
There are many holes in the nets and fractured links in the chains of hegemony
worldwide. Small power states can still exercise power and relative autonomy or at
least flexibility in their domination. Much more research needs to be done on the
power and influence of small and medium powers in the counterhegemonic context.
Notwithstanding the gradual delegitimization of the O.A.S. and increasing
chance of death by a thousand cuts to U.S. power by autonomous leaning leaders,
U.S. power distinguishes regional organizations within Latin America into roughly
two camps: allies and enemies. Independent7 groupings like and other likeminded

7

For initial use, autonomous groupings in this case refer to organizations such as those listed which exclude
the United States of America as a member state and therefore have a greater reputation as independent,
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organizations such as ALBA-TCP, UNASUR, and The Community of Latin American
and Caribbean States (CELAC) would be within the “enemy” camp or those that the
U.S. cannot “deal with.” At the same time, the OAS would be a regional organization
the U.S. can “work with.” Indeed evidence abounds that U.S. policymakers fear
Latin American autonomous regional organizations and countries such as
Venezuela which are “viewed as a strategic threat by the Pentagon and State
Department” but even where not an “unusual and extraordinary threat” and “national
emergency” for the U.S. the “new assertiveness of Brazil and Argentina and the
spread of leftist and autonomist politics to several other countries…also cause the
Washington establishment concern” (Miroff and DeYoung, 2015; Dominguez,
Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 93). Seen to threaten the U.S. interests, U.S. fears of
Latin American regional organizations and leaders include “…ambitions for
continental [Latin American] leadership [by Venezuelan President Chavez],” and
“endogenous, (non-US) cultural development.” Upon further reading of the
literature, one might more simply translate this as one of Lars Schoultz’s three
interests of U.S. policy within Latin America, namely security, or the “fear in
Washington has always been that powerful non-hemispheric powers might use a
base in nearby Latin America to attack the United States” leading to the not so
surprising endurance of antiquated U.S. policy such as the Monroe Doctrine
(Schoultz 1998: 368). These U.S. perspectives are shown in both the unofficial,
(leaked diplomatic cables), and the official, (United States congressional resolutions

autonomous, or even radical. Later within this thesis I will further specifically define political autonomy in a
much fuller way.
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duly passed by Congress and even in some cases indirectly implemented) (2005
Politics; Broadcasting 2008: 34; Library Bill, Kozloff 2011).
The other side of the United States' perspective of fear and uniform rejection
of non-U.S.-led organizations and initiatives is how states respond to this American
repudiation and dread. It might be possible that autonomous decision-makers in the
global South do not need to blatantly display enmity towards the U.S. attempts to
stifle and rollback autonomous initiatives. For instance, while summing up Brazil
under the governments of Lula and Rousseff, Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes (2013: 36,
139) note that while “Lula and Rousseff's administrations have not championed the
cause of 21st-century socialism like Venezuela or Bolivia, their role in regional affairs
has been crucial” and that both Lula and Rousseff were able to “dramatically shift
Brazilian foreign policy”8 paradoxically because they were “willing to toe the line” of
the United States at least to some extent.
The aforementioned raises the idea that decision-makers, states, and even
regional organizations can choose to repudiate any subservience to hegemonic
powers overtly, or they can “toe the line” (or at least appear to) but also still have a
significant degree of autonomy in their decision making9. We should see this in the
same way that the Non-Aligned Movement manipulated the great powers of the
United States and the Soviet Union against each other “in ways that leverage[ed]
their fewer resources towards conducting diplomacy” collectively while establishing a

8

According to Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes under the administrations of Lula and later Rousseff the “foreign
policy paradigm” that had guided Brazil for the “last century” was broken through their support for “several
regional initiatives” among them UNASUR and “countless bilateral agreements” to Latin America’s “left”
governments (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes 2013: 139).
9
This idea may be an important one for further consideration whether later within my analysis within this
thesis or in another piece.
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“collective identity which defined particular social roles, rules and obligations in the
international system” (Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 19).
I will argue that integrationist initiatives of an autonomous stripe are a
departure from the past in that they focus on political integration and specifically
what some have referred to as the “renewal or construction of a Latin-American
identity” over the neoliberal-focused economic integration favored post-“Washington
Consensus” and the varied forms of economic integration during past periods of
integration (Portillo and Mesquita, 2014: 7). Indeed, as others have stated, the
“launching of a regional integration process cannot be separated from superior
political goals…[e]ven if the envisioned regional integration is limited to free trade
and does not include a political dimension, it is always a device that is supposed to
help fulfill political ambitions” (Dabene, 2009: 28). And, whatever “economic
impulse[s] [have always been] inextricably linked to wider political ambitions within
the South” (Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 160).
In tandem with Latin America’s attempt to break from past subordinate power
relations, regional integration dynamics, and economic models are the “turbulent
transition” post what some authors call the “demise of the United States as a
hegemonic power in the hemisphere” and simultaneously the “rise and renewal of
socialism” in Latin America and all of the repercussions this is having, large and
small (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 1). However, even beyond this “turbulent
transition” or “interregnum” is the “rise of the ‘pink tide,’ the left and left-of-center
governments that were led by the likes” of President Hugo Chavez Frias in
Venezuela beginning with his first election in 1998, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and

15 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

Rafael Correa in Ecuador (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 1-2). Though still part
of this ‘pink tide,’ there have been some variations/departures within this movement,
notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru. These outliers will be discussed more in later
sections.
This “tide” was due in large part to the resurgence and the increasing
influence of “social movements in Latin America” since at least the “first decade of
the new millennium” (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 1-2). At the same time,
unlike times in the past, Latin America’s traditional overseer in the region (i.e., the
United States of America) was not able to forestall or otherwise stymie these
changes due to their multiple distractions with “war in the Middle East” as well as the
entry of another emerging hegemonic counterweight 10 in the form of China (and to a
lesser but still significant – though uncoordinated – extent also the other countries
making up the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa or BRICS)
(Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 2-3; BBC BRICS Nations, 2014). One of the
important factors behind Latin America’s “growing independence” was the increasing
influence and cohesion of Latin American regional organizations (Burbach, Fox, and
Fuentes, 2013: 3). In no small part the increasing regional unity of Latin America,
the region’s political independence (i.e., autonomy), and aversion to “all forms of
intervention,” has not only been reinforced but also has grown since the 2003
invasion of Iraq (Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 185-187) but even further back
to at least the very globally divisive bombing of Serbia/Kosovo in 1999. To restate,

10

Though if this hegemonic counterweight only exchanged one hegemony for another still remains to be seen.
However, in the interim, there has been more benefits in terms of foreign policy dynamics (more allowance
for regional autonomy), economical, etc. rather than the opposite.
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the recent expansion in autonomous regional integration has been due in no small
part to the increasing distraction of the traditional overseer of Latin America, the
U.S., in other regions of the world to the detriment of its ability to intervene in Latin
America. Given the increasing quagmires/conflagrations with which the U.S. must
contend at the time of this writing (including a civil war in Syria, the “Islamic State,”
civil strife in Ukraine, etc.), arguably this trend does not appear to be reversing at
any time in the foreseeable future (Francis and Muscat, 2014).
For this paper, though Latin American history from Independence to the
current day is referenced, I, for the most part, do not linger on the period before the
rise of the Pink Tide and the soon after the rise of newly resurgent and autonomous
regional organizations. However, it is important to mention that even before the start
of this time, there were some forms of cooperation between governments and social
movements throughout the region that coordinated actions outside of later regional
groupings such as ALBA-TCP and UNASUR that I will further focus on later here.
For instance, the regional cooperation of Latin America led by leaders such as
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has been credited by many with helping to
stymie worldwide trade pacts such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
and the Doha Development Round (August, 2015; Lendman, 2006).
To date, the literature on regional organizations and sovereignty has not fully
considered the influence of Latin American regional organizations such as UNASUR
in regionally bolstering “autonomy” in the sense of transcending the “subordination of
Latin American countries vis-à-vis the major powers of the international system, and
the region’s limited bargaining power in the international system” (Puntigliano and
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Briceño-Ruiz 2013: 6-7). Put more simply, this autonomy would “strengthen the
regional hand [of Latin America] in dealing with the North, especially with the United
States, and thus minimize the prospects of isolation and abandonment” (Smith 1996:
307). To fill the gaps, I will study the United States (U.S.) and Latin American
international relations and dynamics (e.g., perceived U.S. international allies and
enemies and influence of these allies-enemies in the region whether real or
perceived), and U.S. support and policymaking towards Latin America (e.g., “Plan
Colombia,” “counter-terrorism,” etc.). The purpose of this thesis will be to venture
some initial hypotheses within this area of study to provide a foundation for future
research.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

An overview of the literature on autonomy and regional organizations in Latin
America is long overdue as a first necessary step in recognizing the significance of
both concepts to any study of Latin America. Though in many studies the term
sovereignty is more often used in place of autonomy even then this mention is
usually used about ethnographic (e.g., indigenous popular movements) or
international juridicial studies (Esteva, 2001: 128) or in the individual state sense.
Most infrequently is the incidence of autonomy or sovereignty regionally much less
with any mention of Latin American regional organizations in any connective
manner.
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In approximately the past two decades, there have been dramatic changes in
the types of regional organizations within Latin America, and their increasing
concentration on pushing forward regional integration through political rather than
economic means. The process of Latin American regional integration has been
described most accurately and succinctly as one of “consistency despite instability,
resilience despite crises” (Dabene, 2009: 28). Adding to Dabene’s excellent
summation, others have observed that “[i]n spite of crises, institutional breakdowns
or stagnation, Latin American governments have never rejected the integrationist
idea” and the “persistence in Latin American integration since independence has
been motivated by the search of autonomy, economic development and a
supranational cultural-identity space…[or in] other words…the possibility of
achieving autonomy and development has to a large extent been related to the
creation of a larger union of states consisting of peoples who also share a common
nationhood” (Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, 2013: 6, 8).
I will now begin to unpack the term autonomy and show how it is used in
much of the academic literature I have covered thus far. In a helpful step forward,
autonomy is mentioned directly with Latin America as “develop[ing] areas of relative
autonomy from the economic and political hegemony of the United States” by Emir
Sader in his polemical book The New Mole (Sader, 2011: 27). This direct reference
to the region might be expected from Sader, who is Latin American himself, but this
is a unique case, at least in English language literature. As per usual, autonomy is
not defined. Another side mention of autonomy is found buried in an anthologized
chapter on Venezuela’s social movements by preeminent Latin Americanist Daniel
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Hellinger from the beginning of the twentieth century up until the present (Prevost,
Campos, and Vanden, 2012: 138). Hellinger bandies about the terms of autonomy
and autonomous about either the state as “hyper-autonomous” (2012: 138) and
discusses whether social movements in Venezuela can maintain autonomy between
themselves and the state, especially during and after the election of President Hugo
Chavez in 1998 (2012: 144). However, again, as in many other examples, nowhere
in this essay does the author exactly define what he means by autonomy, nor is the
term mentioned in a regional/supranational sense.
Interestingly, the term autonomy in the context of Latin American international
relations theory and concepts is very difficult to find in English language literature but
seemingly much more commonplace within Latin American authored literature, often
in Spanish and Portuguese. Within a paper on contemporary Latin American
thinking on International Relations published in a Brazilian journal, we find an entire
section analyzing the concept, methodological tool, and strategy of autonomy from
Argentinian and Brazilian “outlooks” in a rarer English language version (BernalMeza, 2016: 6).
According to Arlene Tickner11, two authors, “Helio Juguaribe (one of the
founders of Brazil's ISEB) and Juan Carlos Puig (an ex-minister of Argentine foreign
relations who relocated in Venezuela after the 1976 coup), were particularly
influential in the analysis, dissemination and practice of the autonomy concept in the
region” [Latin America] (Dominguez and Covarrubias, 2014: 78). Further, it is

11

Quoting mostly from books and articles in Spanish and Portuguese.
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important to understand that autonomy from its very ancient Greek origins has been
“defined as an essentially political concept” (Russell and Tokatlian, 2003: 3).
According to Stephen Krasner, there are at least three different meanings of
autonomy in international relations with the first being that “no external actor has
authority within the limits of the state” or a government’s right to be independent of
external authority structures,” the second is as a “condition that allow the nationstate to articulate and achieve political goals independently” and to independently
“make decisions based on its own needs and objectives without interference or
restrictions from abroad, and to control processes or events produced beyond its
borders” (Russell and Tokatlian, 2003: 1-2). The third and final “sense” of
autonomy, according to Krasner, would be the “objective national interests of the
states,” which can be described informally as ‘life, property, and freedom’ (Russell
and Tokatlian, 2003: 1-2). Finally, outside of these three meanings, Krasner further
explains that, “autonomy constitutes a fundamental principle of Westphalian
sovereignty and is described as ‘an institutional arrangement for organizing political
life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors
from domestic authority structures’” (Dominguez and Covarrubias, 2014: 78).
Another of the few fuller mentions of autonomy, though typically without any
overt connections to Latin America12, by way of authority and subordination, in the
international relations (IR) sense would be David A. Lake’s, Hierarchy in
International Relations (Lake 2009: ix – x, 139-140). In responding to the United

12

Again, this follows the stereotypical pattern of non-Latin American author’s neglecting to mention Latin
America within their studies even when everything within the academic, historical, and cultural milieu cries
out for inclusion.
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States invasion of Iraq in 2002 and 2003, Lake argues in opposition to the prevailing
understanding within international relations theory, which describes the international
system as anarchic13, that the system is hierarchic and characterized by a set of
dynamics in which:
…authority [is seen] as a form of international power, coequal with and
perhaps even more important than coercion [and as] a political construct,
authority does not exist absent the legitimacy conferred by subordinates…In
turn, I recognize that authority rests on an exchange of political order for
legitimacy and compliance. To give up some portion of their sovereignty,
subordinate states must get something in return—usually international
security—that is equally if not more valuable.

To summarize, Lake defines the international system as a set of hierarchic
international relations, which is a dramatic break from previous (i.e., international
system as anarchic) understandings within international relations theory (Lake 2009:
x – xiii, 1-3). Relating this to autonomy, Lake argues that there are “three behaviors”
that are a result of “subordinate states [SS]...submission to authority” the first of
which is a “security hierarchy” which manifests as a reduction in the “level of defense
effort” (i.e., of a subordinate state as compared to an “authority” state) (Lake 2009:
138).
In Lake’s understanding, SS “depend upon dominant states for political order
and…protection” so these states can “divert scarce resources to other valued uses.”
In this way, these states willingly ‘sell’ “some measure of their sovereignty” (Lake
2009: 138).14 The second behavior of SS is the effect of increasing “trade

13

“Anarchy is basic to state-centric International Relations because sovereignty is basic to state-centric
International Relations” and the “absence of an external superior implies the absence of ‘government,’ which
is the definition of anarchy” (Brown and Ainley, 2009: 127).
14
Of course, there are many almost comical associations that come to mind here, principally that of a
something familiar to those that follow organized criminal methods of profiteering, that of the “protection
racket.”
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openness” that is the result of this matrix of “security and economic hierarchy” and
promotes “compliance” with the “liberal15 policies of the United States as
institutionalized in the various neoliberal “free trade” agreements and institutions like
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO) (Lake 2009: 138). The third and final behavior of SS is that the
“security and economic hierarchy induce subordinates to join wartime coalitions led
by their dominant state” (Lake 2009: 138-139).
However, even given Lake’s lengthy description of “subordination” and
tangential mentions of autonomy, there is yet no clear explication of autonomy within
this book. We must make our definition of IR autonomy by reading between the
lines throughout this paper. Perhaps the beginning of a definition of autonomy for
this paper should start with the absence or active repudiation of Lake’s “three
behaviors” of subordinate states by a hypothetical autonomous state (Lake 2009:
138). Thus, by exclusion, a state might be considered as autonomous if it had very
little or no military ties with an authority state or cut these ties; if it had very little or
no “trade openness” and economic ties with an authority state; if it had a sufficiently
strong “level of defense effort” (i.e., to maintain autonomy/national sovereignty –
something which will be discussed in more detail later) and finally if this state had
very little or no past or present history of wartime coalitions with authority states.
This definition of IR autonomy by exclusion does have some precedence
within IR history and literature. Specifically, we can relate this idea of cutting ties to
the notions of “collective self-reliance” and “the severance of existing links of

15

Read neoliberal or NeoPanAmerican here.
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dependence operated through the international system by the dominant countries”
(Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 161). Additionally, limiting trade relations with
an authority country could also fit under the collective self-reliance portions of “full
mobilization of domestic capabilities and resources” as well as the “strengthening of
collaboration with other underdeveloped countries” (Alden, Morphet, and Antonio,
2010: 161).
Referring back to Stephen Krasner’s three different meanings of autonomy in
the nation-state sense, I can add some more definition of political autonomy and
counter-hegemony potential embodied within Latin America’s/South America’s
regional organizations taking into context the current socio-political milieu. To the
autonomous definition in this paper, we can add some other characteristics of these
states that sets them apart. The first characteristic would be selecting those regional
organizations that are most explicitly autonomous in the makeup of its member
states (e.g., these states define their autonomy from the U.S. as a core state interest
as evidenced by public proclamations of their leaders, state policy via governmental
documents such as white papers, etc.). The second characteristic would be
identifying one or more regional organization member states that desire autonomy
from the U.S. and has some power to resist U.S. power on its own. Within the third
chapter, I will look at the case studies of China, Russia, and Venezuela in fuller
detail.
Of the members of organizations such as the BRICS, ALBA-TCP, and
UNASUR which are outside of the orbit and sway of the U.S.A., that of Russia under
President Vladimir Putin, China under President Xi Jinping, and Venezuela under
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President Maduro, are the states that have been the strongest and most vociferously
opposed to the domination of U.S.A. in their internal and external affairs of state with
President Chavez calling out “Yankee empire” and “imperialist [mafia] politics”
(Chávez Frías, 2010). Via Xinhua (China’s state news agency), China’s government
has clearly stated that, “Territorial integrity is China’s core interests. Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan and Tibet are all indispensable parts of China. These facts are
beyond doubt and challenge” (Cheng, 2019). President Putin has recently remarked
on a common theme of, “his nation as leading a new world order [along with other
BRICS member states…to] gain equal footing,” over American global unipolar
dominance/imperialism that is crumbling in recent years (Reevell, 2018).
Finally, I will turn my attention to a very brief overview of the various schools
of IR thought and how their approaches to the “balance of power” are relevant here
and particularly how the autonomous regional organizations of Latin America might
or might not be shifting this “balance” back towards Latin America in the region’s
never-ending quest for “autonomy”/sovereignty. Though the concept of “balance of
power,” may have different meanings depending on the context and use, I will
explain and use it in the manner of “world politics in the late twentieth century” (The
Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, s.v. "Balance of Power and Peace").
The concept of “balance of power” has come to be associated most closely with the
“neorealism paradigm” of world politics where “international stability and peace
[“defined as the absence of major-power war over system leadership”] depend on
the distribution of power capabilities among major powers within the interstate
system” but argue over whether this “is best achieved under conditions of ‘parity’ or
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‘preponderance’ (The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, s.v. "Balance of
Power and Peace").
“Parity scholars argue that stability is achieved when there exists a rough
equivalence of capabilities among major powers” and that “a multipolar system of
more than two major powers was more stable, in that none of the powers could
afford a focused rivalry on any one other” and this “diffused attention would allow for
more flexible foreign policies, amelioration of tensions, and mediation than under a
bipolar system” (The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, s.v. “Balance of
Power and Peace”). Meanwhile, on the other side of this IR divide
neorealist/‘preponderance’ paragons such as Kenneth Waltz16 argues “that the
increased number of major powers and diffusion of attention increases the
opportunities for miscalculation and misperception” (The Oxford International
Encyclopedia of Peace, s.v. “Balance of Power and Peace”).

EMPIRICAL CONTEXT

In recent decades, at least among the “scarcity of non-Latin American
authors,”17 there has been a greater analysis of regional organizations and their
political dimensions. Of course, in this paper, we will strive to overcome these
16

Contemporary IR theory was tremendously influenced by Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 volume, Theory of
International Politics, which according to some “revitalized…realism” as well as their theoretical opponents
(Brown and Ainley, 2009: 40).
17
“Notwithstanding the valuable intellectual contributions of foreign pundits, most of them lack the
contextual historical vision or interest in integrationist processes and the forces behind them. For example, to
write about ‘philosophies in Latin America’ is not the same as writing about ‘Latin American philosophy’; and
to analyze the different expressions pointing towards a common nationhood [and even when they do] they
hardly take into account economic and policy issues” (Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz 2013, 6-7). We will
attempt to repudiate and redress these inadequacies and inconsistencies within this thesis.
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tendencies. Still, the evidence of this dearth of non-Latin American authors writing
about regional integration and their “Europeanized” biases and deficiencies are rife
(Dabene 2009: 3). For example, in a section entitled “Integration theory, federalism
and neofunctionalism,” Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley (2009: 133) state that the
“most important testing ground for ideas on integration has been Europe” with no
recognition of Latin America’s influence nor for that matter any other regions of the
world. Everything in this section relates only to European integration. It thus repeats
all of the same observations which Dabene makes clear are not “fit to travel to Latin
America,” do not “accurately help to describe” the integration process, and finally do
not even “help to raise good questions” (2009: 7).
Ernesto Vivares (2014: 1) adds to this observation by stating that
neoliberalism and regionalism, or for this paper, regional integration more
specifically, from the 1980s until 2004, went together virtually in lockstep. However,
there was a break in this progression when in 2004 during a regional summit (the
Summit of the Americas) which was meant to further assimilate Latin America into
this neoliberal and thoroughly American matrix, Latin America broke with this
arrangement and set the stage for further autonomous and counter-hegemonic
resistance (Vivares 2014: 1). Since this 2004 break with regional integration and
neoliberalism under the auspices of the hegemonic authority of the United States of
America (U.S.A.), “the political economy of South America has historically turned in
a sort of new regional identity which does not fit the model of the dominant ideas of
regionalism in either the North American, the European, or the Asian projects.” This
“regional identity was marked by the dynamic of new social forces that emerged in
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the last two decades of neoliberal reforms, with politics, the return of the state,
democracy, and commodities becoming the central drivers of regional development”
(Vivares 2014: 1).
An excellent step in the direction of identifying Latin American integration free
of Europeanization biases is provided by Olivier Dabene. In his analysis, which
covers a multitude of both “classical” and contemporary definitions, Olivier Dabene
(2009: 10-11) finally defines regional integration in Latin America as a:
…historical process of increased levels of interaction between political units
(subnational, national, or transnational), provided by actors sharing common
ideas, setting objectives, and defining methods to achieve them, and by so
doing contributing to building a region. There are three corollaries to this
definition: (1) the process can encompass a great diversity of actors (private
and public), levels (from below and from above), and agendas; (2) It can
result from a deliberate strategy or emerge as an unintended consequence of
a social interaction; and (3) not least, it can entail institution building.

The economic objectives of regional integration have been described in part
as marshaling the “potential of collaborative project financing, preferential trade
agreements, the forging of larger markets and taking advantage of creating the
conditions for sustainable development” (Alden, Morphet, and Antonio, 2010: 160).
No unpacking of political autonomy within the processes of Latin American
regional integration would be complete without a brief covering of the age-old schism
within international relations theory between scholars in the realist (a.k.a.
realpolitick/conservative/nationalist/state-centered/pessimist) school and those in the
constructivist (a.k.a. institutionalist, globalism, new world order, liberal
institutionalism, idealism) (Rourke and Boyer, 2002: 11).
In the realist school, a scholar at the forefront is John J. Mearsheimer, who
questions the entire basis of the significance of regional organizations and
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integration having any significant or measurable effects on anything from regional
peace to policymaking (Mearsheimer, 1994: 5-46). To use Mearsheimer’s wording
for what he deridingly refers to as his intellectual opposites “institutionalists” (i.e.,
“constructivists”) throughout his article, “The False Promise of International
Institutions,” he “explicitly rejects” any “promise” (in this case the utter futility of
institutions to affect the promotion of “world peace”) of “international institutions”
which would include regional organizations (in his article looking mostly at European
security arrangements) (Mearsheimer, 1994: 5).
This arch-realist’s point is not that international institutions/regional
organizations do not matter but that they matter only as much as founding nationstates have a use for them. In an online video, Mearsheimer remarks that “because
the system is anarchic, because there's no higher authority that sits above states,
there's nobody that you can turn to…So you're in a very vulnerable situation, and the
way to avoid that is to be very powerful” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Further,
Mearsheimer says that “I do not believe that domestic politics – I do not believe that
the composition or the make-up of individual states matters very much for how those
states behave on a day-to-day basis in international politics” (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Mearsheimer refers to “critical IR [International Relations] theory” throughout
his paper as having aimed to “transform the fundamental nature of international
politics and to create a world where there is not just cooperation among states, but
the possibility of genuine peace [and] directly challenges realist thinking about the
self-interested behavior of states” (Mearsheimer, 1994: 7, 14-15). Further, for
Mearsheimer, critical IR theory is “predicated on the assumption that ideas and
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discourse – how we think and talk about international politics – are the driving forces
behind state behavior” and that “ideas [of intellectuals/critical theorists themselves]
shape the material world in important ways” (Mearsheimer, 1994: 15). It must be
noted here that this extremely brief definition of Mearsheimer’s self-declared
antithetical theory is almost absurdly brief in comparison to realism to which he
devotes more than five pages not to mention that this entire passage seems to be an
especially sardonic and dismissive description of ideas of intellectuals/critical
theorists shaping the material world and the actions of states (Mearsheimer, 1994:
15).
However, the scholarly rejoinder was not long in coming from Yale
University’s Alexander Wendt (Mearsheimer was writing from the University of
Chicago) who writes that it is unfortunate that for all of the welcoming aspects of
Mearsheimer’s article it is overall a loss because his work is “so full of conflations,
half-truths, and misunderstandings” (Wendt, 1995: 71). However, other than
scholarly vituperation, Wendt also makes quite a few incisive responses from the
critical international relations theory and constructivist intellectual schools to
Mearsheimer’s initial realist salvo (Wendt, 1995: 71-73).
One of Wendt’s first determinations of Mearsheimer’s inaccuracies also
pointed out by many other observers was his agglomeration of what he referred to
as “Critical Theory.” However, “Critical Theory,” is considerably more than
Mearsheimer’s dismissive and reductionist portrayal obscures and distorts about
what is otherwise known as “Constructivism” and the “English School” (Brown and
Ainley, 2009: 48). The “central insight of constructivist thought” is the “notion that
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there is a fundamental distinction to be made between ‘brute facts’ about the world,
which remain true independent of human action, and ‘social facts,’ which depend for
their existence on socially established conventions” (Brown and Ainley, 2009: 4849). According to constructivists, a “cardinal error” that realists make with “some
frequency” is the mistaking of a “social fact for a brute fact…because it leads to the
ascription of a natural status to conditions that have been produced and may be, in
principle, open to change” (Brown and Ainley, 2009: 48-49). In other words,
“Identities and interests are both socially constructed – change is possible – anarchy
may also change in accordance with other changes” (Dittmar, 2015).
To summarize, to realists, domestic interests, individuals within national
governments, etc. have no impact on the anarchic system and brute power, and
perpetual conflict is inevitable between people, governments, etc. based on these
power dynamics. On the other hand, to constructivists, all of this is subject to
change, conflict is not inherent, and individuals, governments, etc. can and do
socially construct international political conditions based on their speech, etc.
Regional organizations matter only as powerful (in terms of military power,
projection, domination, etc.) are the founding states or member states that
compromise the membership of these regional organizations, and that use these
organizations as extensions or agglomerations of their brute power.
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METHODOLOGY

To make up for the missing pieces of this autonomy puzzle, I will study
commonly accepted U.S. international “allies” and “enemies” and the influence of
these parties in the region on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, U.S.
financial, military, etc. support, and policymaking towards Latin America. The
purpose of this thesis will be to venture some initial hypotheses within this area of
study to provide a foundation for future research. Each of the pieces I will be slotting
into place will be closely analyzed with regional organizations seeking to answer
whether they are a factor or not and why in each case. Of course, it might very well
be the case that regional organizations were not only not a factor in many cases, but
even where they were their roles might run directly counter to my working
hypothesis. I will pay extra attention to the cases where I think regional
organizations did play a role, and if the results of my analysis disprove aspects of or
my entire thesis, this will be made clear.
The first chapter is the introduction focusing on establishing my arguments
and hypotheses. The second chapter will focus on U.S. military and financial
support to Latin America, particularly on Plan Colombia. It will discuss the military
aid that is predominant within this policy matrix, the foreign policy dynamics of this
parasitic relationship between the United States and Colombia, and finally, whether
and how this milieu is affected by other countries in the area and by regional
organizations’ policymaking and geopolitical influence. Did regional organizations
(or the member states) serve as counterweights that attenuated the implementation
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of Plan Colombia and other aspects of domestic and foreign policy? In addition to
the roles that military aid plays in Latin America, this chapter will also look at the
roles of related foreign policy tools of the United States in Latin America, including
“anti-terrorism” and “drug-interdiction” efforts in Mexico and the role of regional
organizations if any. Did regional organizations founded in part by “Pink Tide”
countries serve as a means to push back against U.S. reframing of
counterinsurgency in Latin America as “anti-terrorism” or “drug interdiction.”
The third and last chapter will lay out the dynamics of foreign policy influence
of countries and external groupings other than those of the United States within Latin
America. Have more autonomous regional organizations facilitated power-balancing
in the region by smoothing the way for increasing the influence of extra-regional
powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – BRICS – ), especially
Russia and China? The concluding chapter will seek to not only summarize the
findings up until that point but also to tie them together and offer some final
observations, results as they pertain to my thesis, further hypotheses, and finally
speculation as to the influence of autonomous regional organizations and member
states after the death of President Hugo Chavez (a lynchpin and one of the biggest
former proponents of regional integration), the decline of petroleum prices, etc. as
well as the broader implications of my results.
Primary bibliographic resources I plan to include the “not-for-profit media
organisation <sic>” Wikileaks online database, which publishes secret and classified
information for the public (Wikileaks 2014a). Within the Wikileaks database, I plan
on paying close attention to leaked and unvarnished U.S. diplomatic cables or
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“Cablegate” documents, which include U.S. official comments and information on
regional organizations and the U.S. and Latin American policymaking interchanges
among many other things. I will use the websites of regional organizations and their
archived documents as another primary resource whenever possible. Also, I will use
printed and broadcast interviews, journalistic reports with representatives of regional
organizations and other experts, and recorded media. Finally, the last resource will
be the writings of Latin America’s regional integration architects such as Simón
Bolívar.
Secondary resources I have been using include academic anthologies as
indispensable sources on themes like Latin American regionalism, sociopolitical
responses to neoliberalism, and social change. My mainstays in this anthological
group will include Resilience of Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean by
Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz (2013), Exploring the New South American
Regionalism (NSAR) (Vivares 2014), Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?
(Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts 2009), and Neoliberalism, Interrupted (Goodale and
Postero 2013). Also, there are equally invaluable theoretical and comparative
introductions and overviews that I will continue to utilize, including The Politics of
Regional Integration in Latin America (Dabene 2009). Besides, standalone volumes
like Peter H. Smith’s Talons of the Eagle (1996) and Lars Schoultz’s Beneath the
United States (1998) will be used as historical and background supports. Magazine,
newspaper, and websites will also supplement all of the above for past and current
news events, background, analysis, etc.
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SIGNIFICANCE

The purpose of this thesis is to show that there is a demonstrable impetus
towards regional integration for collective autonomy/sovereignty throughout Latin
American history independent of time, place, governance, and other variables; that
regional integration matters, and why it matters. I will strive to answer the how, why,
where, and in which ways Latin American regionalism prioritizes collective
sovereignty/autonomy opposite United States hegemony and political over economic
matters, or conversely where subordination or some other state of being is
displayed. Of course, it is certainly possible that there may be cases where there is
insufficient information to decide or conflicting information, which will only serve to
make a more well-rounded and understandable whole.
Invariably there will be many skeptics which pose the question, “Why is this
time (i.e., historical period) any different?” Through my analysis of various political
case studies, I will show that though the integrationist initiatives and the actors may
vary they all fight to wrest autonomy (i.e., break the shackles of over a century of
control and coercion by United States hegemonic power) in matters at all levels of
state in some way. The results of my study will show in detail how, in what ways,
actors’ autonomy or conversely subservience is exhibited by these rising world
powers.
I will strive to clearly show autonomy that is not a rearrangement of the
hegemonic shackles in more comforting ways by helpless captives but concussive
blows mightily struggling to break free of these chains. This is not John Holloway’s
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glacially incremental and pusillanimous “anti-power” but instead “taking power”
(Wilpert 2007) from the hegemon through the assertion of national and regional
autonomy. Of course, none of this “easy,” there have been many attempts in the
past to integrate the region that have faltered only to linger on into the present,
sometimes working alongside their subsequent iterations, and sometimes
duplicating or even making sources of potential interference with their institutional
brethren. At the same time, the “traditional” sources of frictions between national
and regional integration and the reluctance of many leaders to willing cede any
sovereignty (even if so trivial as to be virtually indistinguishable from the status quo)
towards the purpose of integration have often reared their hydra heads during the
many years of trials and tribulations. Even with this being said, there are still many
glimmers of hope among the points of darkness, and I will endeavor to clearly
explain both the tensions and the reasons for hope in what follows.
Some authors speak of an enduring resilience of regional integration in the
region. In contrast, others talk about “consistency despite instability, resilience
despite crises” (Dabene, 2009: 28) but in either case, I will strive to show that the
governing elites of Latin America continue to display this regularly in the infinite
variety of initiatives which offer strong rebukes of Simon Bolivar’s attributed
despondent quotation that unifying the region is a “fool’s errand” similar to
“ploug[hing] the sea” (Dabene, 2009: 13; Bolívar 2003: 146). Even apart from elites,
there is a significant portion of the other people of Latin America and diaspora who
also hold this urge and without which there might not be the continued incentive for
policymakers to keep integrationist initiatives at the forefront for decades. I hope to

36 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

show how and why this time is different for Latin America and particularly why this
matters politically not only for the elites making policy but especially for the millions
of people residing there. In many ways, this is a “second independence” for the
region, and I hope that my study will clearly show this is an incontrovertible reality
that even the reigning hegemons must now recognize.

CHAPTER 2
MILITARY AID OR HEMISPHERIC HEGEMONY

The subordinates of the American empire have always been instrumental,
serving as essential bulwarks and implementers of US interests without directly
tarnishing North America’s often troublesome image in the region. Though these
lieutenants for hegemony may have changed over the years what is demanded of
these servitor state’s remains the same, broadly speaking “to counter democratic
and popular movements across the continent” [i.e., South America in this case]
(Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 78).
According to Diana Raby, a “linchpin” of “U.S. hegemony” and a “perfect
regional ally (or client state)” to the U.S. has been and is, Colombia (Dominguez,
Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 81). As we shall see, with the definitions of autonomy
and subordination I have already mentioned in mind, Colombia seems to be one of
the clearest cases of subordination in the senses that I have defined it. A variety of
factors have conspired to make Colombia the optimal client state/enforcer in the
region including a “singular configuration of power,” the “exceptional strength of the
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oligarchy over the past half-century,” its reliability as a client state, “a strategic
location linking Atlantic and Pacific, Central and South America, is of inestimable
value to Washington” (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 93). Colombia’s
value as a strategic ally has only increased by magnitudes in the post-Cold War and
“rise of anti-imperialist and/or independent-minded governments in neighboring
countries” (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 93). As former U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia (under George Bush Jr.) from 2003 to 2007 has stated
about Colombia, “There is no country, including Afghanistan, where we [the U.S.]
had more going on” (Priest, 2013).
In this chapter, the focus will be on our definition in opposition to an
autonomous (a.k.a. counter-hegemonic) state as a state that cuts military and other
ties with the United States of America. As one of its closest and most stalwart of
ally’s, Colombia’s dealings with the U.S. will be prominent (e.g., Plan Colombia,
bombing raid by Colombia against a Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia
- FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - camp within Ecuadorian borders
without any prior notification of Ecuador or any of Colombia’s neighbors, the “seven
military bases” deal/a.k.a. Defense Cooperation Agreement DCA, etc.), but I will also
analyze the influence of Latin American regional organizations on the preceding
(Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 34-35 and Bitar, 2013: 1-3). At the end of this
chapter, I will look to conclude with the “on the ground” realities of Plan Colombia as
well as the influences of regional organizations on it and its outgrowths such as the
DCA through unvarnished primary sources such as leaked “diplomatic cables”
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collected by Wikileaks as well as human rights organization’s working out of
Colombia and the United States.
The importance of, and the reason for, my focus on leaked diplomatic cables
stems from the fact that they come from the main hegemon of Latin America, the
United States, and were intended to be hidden from public and academic study in
perpetuity. These leaked diplomatic cables along with my analysis which considers
secondary academic sources, as well as the journalistic and factual accounts, help
to arrive at as close as possible to the undisguised truth of realities on the ground
within Latin America as these pertain to regional organizational influence,
international political/foreign policy dynamics, as well as domestic political factors.
My analysis of U.S. diplomatic cables and the accounts of human rights
organizations seeks out mentions of regional organizations trending towards political
autonomy such as ALBA-TCP and UNASUR and determines that the mentions of
these organizations within these primary sources point to their increasing influence
as evidenced by the corresponding rise in the frequency of their mention and the
chagrin with which hegemonic powers view them. And indeed, U.S. hegemony in
Colombia has been evident from the very first years of Colombian independence.
Even in comments approximately only forty years from the beginning of
United States history, American diplomat and politician from 1826-1827 Beaufort
Watts, described the typical Colombian citizen as little more than “an obedient
animal that fawns when chastised” (Schoultz, 1998: 13). Obviously, the preceding
comment is a bit more extreme example from a then still “rough at the edges”
hegemonic power. Yet, many Latin American’s in the present day might argue that it
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would not be a complete shock if this same wording came from a leaked private
conversation or unvarnished comment caught from an unexpectedly active
microphone in the current day. Even two centuries after this comment was, but a
historical footnote the United States policy interests in Latin America remain very
much the same, or as Lars Schoultz has observed, “the need to protect U.S.
security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic politics, and the
drive to promote U.S. economic development” (Schoultz, 1998: 367).
These rigid hegemonic demands have led to increasing pressures on
American and Colombian elites to continually expand military aid and American
military power within all aspects of Colombia's political life. Unfortunately, in the
arena of violence, Colombia has a long and gory history that does not need any
“help” from their American counterparts. Even a cursory look at Colombian history
will show that since independence “political differences…have tended to lead to
violence” regardless of social class but always to the ultimate benefit of the
“dominant elites” (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 78). Civil strife in
Colombia did not begin with the outbreak of revolutionary guerilla warfare on the part
of the FARC (among others) (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 78-80).
Instead, there was a long list of civil conflicts soon after independence, La Violencia
of 1948-58, and the ongoing armed conflict from 1964 to the present, “involving
Colombia’s guerilla groups, the state, and right-wing paramilitary groups”
(Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 78-79). Even if there is not an easily
discernable connection between U.S. military aid flooding Colombia and the
continuing political violence, it has certainly inflamed an already charged tinderbox.

40 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

One of the strongest “flames” of this U.S./Colombia relationship has been the
bilateral raft of funding and policies originating almost in tandem in both the United
States of America and which has come to be known as “Plan Colombia” and all of
the consequences of this bilateral entanglement including primarily Colombian
attacks against neighboring countries (e.g., bombing raid against FARC camp within
the borders of Ecuador) or the seven bases bilateral deal between Colombia and the
U.S. (Vivares, 2014: 37). Plan Colombia has been described as a “counter-drugs
strategy, but one with a clear counterinsurgency aim” initially promoted in the US
around mid-1999 by Clinton administration officials and allies (Friesendorf, 2007:
130 ) and subsequently seconded in concert with laws and policies by Colombia
under Colombian President Andrés Pastrana (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam,
2011: 40, 84-85).18 The official casting of Plan Colombia to Colombia’s Latin
American neighbors as simply securing the country against crime and drug
trafficking has not been accepted readily, if at all, by countries bordering Colombia
like Brazil, and has been a “tense and delicate subject” in regional affairs from Peru
and Ecuador to Venezuela (Vivares, 2014: 202).
Indeed, ostensible attempts to control drug supply or the subtextual motives
of counter-insurgency have been counterproductive when they are not disastrous,
and many have described it as a “failed war” (Barbu and Cincu, 2014: 115).
Embedded as a hidden virus within this “drug war” are not only the counterinsurgency intents but also other hidden motives have increasingly been revealed,
including spying and subversion of governments (Lefebvre, 2014 and Devereaux,

18

The timing of this bilateral raft of funding and policies coming right after the US bombing campaign against
Serbia is something I will describe and analyze later in detail.
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Greenwald and Poitras, 2014). The overarching intent has always been to reimpose U.S. hegemony and hemispheric preeminence19 and to forestall at all costs
the “threat of a good example” or the hint of resistance to the U.S. hegemony by way
of alternatives to North American hemispheric dominance (Chomsky, 1986). United
States' geopolitical/strategic intents towards hemispheric supremacy have not
always been camouflaged but, in some cases, unabashed.
Though the official beginning of Plan Colombia was in the 1990s, its roots go
much deeper. This soup of commingled U.S. and Colombian policy is something
“new” in the bilateral relations of these two countries but also something “old.”
James Petras writes that it is a continuation of former President John F. Kennedy’s
“counter-insurgency programme” (i.e., propagation of “internal war”) in Colombia and
President Bill Clinton’s extension of said counter-insurgency program with the only
differences being the “ideological justifications for US intervention, the scale and
scope of US involvement and the regional context of the intervention” (Petras, 2001:
4617). During the Cold War, the threat/ideological justification was the alleged
spread of international communism, and in the current context, the justifications
have shifted to the drug threat. Still, in both cases, there is a “total denial of the
historical-sociological basis of the conflict” (Petras, 2001: 4617). Petras’ noted
differences of Plan Colombia from Kennedy’s policies also refer to the much larger

19

My intent here is not to place blame on one or the other political party this hegemony/preeminence stripe
within North American foreign policy finds all power brokers equally culpable. While certain administrations
such as President Clinton and President Obama were more adept at diplomacy to those they wished to sway
the “Obama administration is [still] following in the footsteps of the Bush administration as It boosts the US
military presence in Latin America in tandem with the promotion of free trade agreements” in only his first
year in office “Obama moved to establish seven military bases in Colombia, and augmented the activities of
the 4th Fleet, which George Bush had pulled out of mothballs and assigned the mission of plying the oceanic
waters off Latin America” (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 34).
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magnitude of Plan Colombia and that the “threats” to U.S. hegemony now have
multiplied regionally to include Colombia’s neighbors of a more ideologically “Left”
persuasion including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina who directly and
blatantly voice their opposition to not only Plan Colombia but also U.S. hegemonic
actions and plans (Petras, 2001: 4617-4618).
With the increasing diplomatic, financial, etc. push by the U.S. behind Plan
Colombia, there was a consequent rising of political tensions in Latin America with
Brazil first and foremost as the acknowledged regional leader (hegemon?). Brazil
takes its ownership of the region seriously. So this has naturally put the country in
direct opposition against the U.S. progressively seeing the hegemon to the North as
a “geopolitical interloper in a region” an “unrealiable partner” and a threat to Brazilian
national integrity and security (Vivares, 2014: 39). Indeed, the reasons for Brazilian
animus against the U.S. in part because it supported Plan Colombia was a long list
of complaints from geopolitical rivalry, Brazil feeling that it “should be the primary
power and lead resolution of political and security crises,” to an implied threat of
“direct U.S. military presence in a region that Brazil saw as its theater of operations,
but also posed a direct threat to Brazil’s strategic objective of exerting control over
the Amazon” by further de-stabilizing “an area of strategic value for Brazil” (Vivares,
2014: 39).
However, the regional opposition to Plan Colombia has not been relegated to
the nascent local sub-hegemon Brazil. Still, it has been widespread through
neighboring states with immediate neighbors Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia
among the strongest opponents. Beyond even the counterproductive results and

43 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

hidden motives that we will describe in more detail later in this chapter, the numbers
behind the massive military buildup of Colombia encouraged and directly supported
by the U.S. is truly staggering.
In the span of only eight years, from 2000 to 2008, Colombian defense
spending increased from $4 to $12 billion, and the armed forces from 145,000 to
236,000 members (Lohmuller, 2015). To elaborate on and put this in further
perspective, as of 2014 Colombia currently has the largest army in Latin America
and the source of this newfound martial prowess has been provided through the at
least 7 billion dollars of United States money in less than a decade and of this
money it is conservatively estimated that three-quarters were funneled only to the
military and police (Bustelo, 2014). Further, it is important to note that North
American financing has “made Colombia the largest20 non-Middle Eastern recipient
of military aid and the third in the world (after Israel and Egypt).” The at first hidden
motives of counter-insurgency were later codified somewhat into U.S. legislation
around Colombian military aid as counter-terrorism in 2003, less than five years into
its implementation (Bustelo, 2014).
This funding has increasingly led to Colombian governmental and military
elites increasing their control not only within the country but also as “reliable partner”
for the United States which the U.S. is more and more relying on Colombia for
“external operations” (e.g., throughout the continent and even worldwide) funded

20

Of course, it should be noted here that U.S. military support ostensibly toward the aims of counter-drug
offensives but also manifesting again in counter-insurgency in Mexico through the “Mérida Initiative” has now
worked out to “nearly $3 billion on security aid” and “direct sales of arms and other equipment, which totaled
over $1.15 billion last year [2014] alone” from the United States to Mexico in a counter-drug strategy
“modeled on Plan Colombia” (Currier and Franzblau, 2015).
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exclusively by U.S. funds but “under less control [i.e., governmental and nongovernmental oversight] and at lower cost” (Bustelo, 2014). Truly, Colombia is no
longer only a subordinate enforcer but also a proxy for U.S. power projection and
hegemonic ambitions.

DCA, Bombing Ecuador

The willing subjugation of Colombian elites to U.S. largess is truly impressive.
For instance, the seven military bases deal in which Colombia agreed to allow “U.S.
personnel to be stationed at seven military bases” within the country and which was
tied to a requirement of the U.S. moving forward with a “trade pact” (TPP) that the
South American nation “wants” (CNN Colombia, U.S., 2009). Though this
agreement was mooted just one year later by Colombian courts, the diplomatic
bomb had already been lit, and the region was on fire.
It did not take long for this firestorm of Latin American elite disapproval to
“blowback” on its Colombian progenitors. For instance, immediately after the signing
of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) (or informally known “seven bases
deal”) on Friday, October 30, 2009, one of Colombia’s major newsweekly’s Semana
publicized a U.S. Air Force document known by a typically bureaucratic and
seemingly benign title, “Budget Estimate Justification Data for the Military
Construction Program of the U.S. Air Force” (Council, 2009). However, aside from
the potential boredom inducing nomenclature, the Air Force document contained
some, to say the least, troubling language for Latin American policymakers. For
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example, one of the most disturbing phrases within this document “intended to
defend the appropriation [to the U.S. Congress] of $46 million to outfit and update”
was the sinister “‘opportunity for conducting full spectrum operations throughout
South America’ against threats not only from drug trafficking and guerrilla
movements, but also from ‘anti-U.S. governments’ in the region” (Council, 2009).
The official motives behind the document were justifying “massive” U.S.
Congressional investment into one of the “seven bases” of the DCA, and due to the
overwhelming secrecy up to that point in the international agreement, it was rightly
seized upon to describe the entire DCA. Of course, this language was overly broad,
damning, and sensationalistic enough that it gained a large amount of publicity in a
very short time, especially among those more vigilant of the North American’s history
of hegemony/power in Latin America.”
Elites in the rest of Latin America (excepting Colombia) had good reasons to
be extremely skeptical of the good intentions of Colombia and the U.S. and their
justifications. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that the very Colombian military base,
Palanquero and its radar equipment installed by a U.S. team was the heart of the
U.S. Air Force “Budget Justification” to Congress, and “indispensable in the bombing
raid operation into Ecuador that killed FARC Commander Raúl Reyes” (Lefer and
Aristizábal, 2010). “Full-spectrum dominance” against “anti-US governments in the
region” was not just words in an obscure government archive but actions already
taking place within Latin America.
The “Military Group” section of the Wikileaks cables concerning Colombia
shows the reality of “full-spectrum dominance” in the region regardless of the
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diplomatic and military speak of the cable. For example, Ambassador Wood while
translating U.S. military and diplomatic “considerable concern” over a recalcitrant
Colombian Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega Commander, General Fracica,
unwillingness to “work with US trainers” and their “efforts to do training on-site
exploration following destruction of a FARC camp and verify tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs)” which were in jeopardy due in part to General Fracica who
“continues to cause problems” (Wood, 2005). Even supposedly devoid of any
sentiment, this wording still manages to dramatically convey emotion, and the reality
of what U.S. money and military support of foreign militaries really mean. No matter
the vacuous wording relayed to a U.S. military trainer (much less to a U.S. taxpayer)
tasked with “on-site exploration following destruction of a FARC camp” would surely
see what the intent (not to mention the consequences of U.S. government policies)
and on the ground implementation of these orders were through any attempted
obfuscation. In ironical terms that certainly escape Ambassador Wood, the “verify
tactics, techniques, and procedures,” which were in “jeopardy” take on a sinister
aspect that has very unfortunate echoes of “corporatese” and institutional speak,
which continually mentions “best practices.”
Underlining the vociferous opposition to the deal within the region was the
fact that every single president on the South American continent other than the
president of the instigating country opposed21 the deal (Dangl, 2010). The
Colombian Constitutional Courts decision may have been a way to “mend fences”
between Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador which some would argue came close

21

Though some much more vociferously than others.
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to war in the aftermath of Colombia’s surprise bombing raid on March 1, 2008, into
Ecuador attacking a FARC camp but it did little to assuage its sovereign neighbors in
any way (Pimiento and Lindsay-Poland, 2010). Indeed, instead of calming matters
in the region diplomatic relations between Colombia, the rest of South America was
at all-time lows even after this court decision.
Brazil’s very instructive response via Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was that:
“‘The situation is serious. Any violation of territorial integrity is very serious ...
It is reprehensible,’ he said, adding that Ecuador suspended diplomatic
relations with Colombia. The information reached the Chancellor an hour
before the start of the conference. Amorim repeated several times that Brazil
is interested in peace in the region, and talked to several South American
ministers and the secretary general of the Organization of American States
(OAS) on the diplomatic crisis…[and he] stressed that the OAS is the
appropriate forum to discuss the impasse, since it has legal provisions ‘more
finished’ on the topic…‘We want peace in the continent,’ he said, noting that
Brazil has good relations with Colombia and Ecuador, and the Brazilian
government will adopt a neutral stance in the deadlock.” (Congressoemfoco,
2013).

Cannily playing the “neutral peacemaker,” Brazil’s response while obvious to
many was still well laid out within this summary, “we” [Brazil’s government] “feel the
pain” of an outraged and violated Ecuador while not directly referring to any
judgement or even observation of the rightness, wrongness, or otherwise of
Colombia’s actions he did say that “the two sides give different versions of the
episode” and that international relations treaties document that ‘self-defense’ and
‘hot pursuit’ are in some cases allowed (at this is implicit within his comments) but
that the “burden of justification [is on the] attacker” (Congressoemfoco, 2013).
Former Foreign Minister Amorim tread a very delicate line in this very tense
situation, and this article gives the reader an idea about the layers of diplomacy with
a multitude of actors between neighboring states, within the region, as well as
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internationally. This account also informs me particularly about the logic and
thinking behind the decisions of not only Brazil but also other important interlocutors
in taking the decisions to go to the OAS first before the still embryonic “South
American Defense Council” (CDS, by its Spanish acronym and which would later be
subsumed within UNASUR) UNASUR as well keeping virtually all negotiations and
even official declarations “in house” (though perhaps shared with the U.S.) and/or
principally amongst the states of Latin America.
Aside from threats of war and diplomatic differences, a first for the region at
this time was the role of the potential autonomous vanguard regional organizations,
UNASUR and ALBA. It could be argued that one unexpected result of the overall
disastrous decision of Colombia and the U.S. to mount the raid into Ecuador was the
beginning steps of Latin America to respond in a coordinated way to actions of its
sovereign states through the creation of UNASUR in its immediate wake, and to
begin to pull away from the patriarchal role that the U.S. would usually play in this
situation through one of its pliant partner regional organizations, the O.A.S.
(Sanahuja, 2012: 17). However, I must emphasize here that the role of the O.A.S.
was by no means over, though this moment in time might have marked the
beginning of a gradual move away from the preeminent role that the O.A.S. played
in past political and diplomatic firestorms.
This attack which threatened the peace which the South American continent
had enjoyed for several decades and which potentially brought together the region
via its autonomous regional organizations began with the ex post facto
announcement of the then Defense Minister of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, via a
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press conference that there had been a military bombardment of a camp where a
member of the FARC Secretariat alias Raul Reyes was present (tests of the remains
later confirmed his identity and death) “near the border with Ecuador” but within
Colombia22 (BBC Mundo, 2008). The first that Ecuadorian President Correa knew of
the bombing of his country’s territory by a neighboring country was when the then
President of Colombia Uribe called President Correa to inform of this military attack
interrupting an interview in progress with an international news station CNN (BBC
Mundo, 2008).
Indeed, out of the raging fire started by Colombia’s bombing raid against the
FARC encampment in March 2008 came the very next day a proposal for the CDS,
by Brazilian President (2003 – 2011) Lula da Silva as an emergency “crisis
management” organization meant, of course, to help to mitigate (and hopefully
prevent) these situations in the future (Sanahuja, 2012: 17-18). This CDS, along
with UNASUR, were both officially announced and constituted at the South
American Summit of Brasilia May 23, 2008 (Giovanni and Palestini-Cespedes, 2014:
1). UNASUR’s own official historical timeline goes back several years further to a
series of meetings beginning “December 8, 2004, at the Meeting of Presidents of
South America, held in Cuzco, Peru, the South American Community of Nations
(CSN), which later gave way to the formation of the Union of South American
Nations was created, UNASUR” (UNASUR, 2015).

22

Very soon after it was admitted that the bombing and multiple flyovers – not to mention previous longrunning intelligence operations – all occurred in Ecuador without any prior notification, permission,
coordination with the Ecuadorian government in contravention of international law, diplomatic practice, etc.
(BBC Mundo, 2008).
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It is important to note here that in addition to the Meeting of Presidents of
South America another very important progenitor of UNASUR MERCOSUR
(Mercado Común del Sur) presiding over this first meeting of the Presidents of South
America and MERCOSUR was than Brazilian President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso in 2000 during which time he was turning “away from...the FTAA in the
wake of the financial crisis that affected Brazil to embrace a more developmentalist
approach to exploiting Brazil's natural resources and agriculture” (Nelson, 2015: 7).
This same author further posits that the “initiation of institutional mechanisms to
facilitate the development of physical and financial infrastructure necessary to
facilitate the exploitation of those sectors of the economy [natural resources and
agriculture] has been a driving force in the development of the UNASUR” (Nelson,
2015: 7).
The CDS23 and its soon after (this was the very unlikely case of the egg
coming before the chicken) parent organization UNASUR were both considered
innovations of Latin American regionalism in that “it has advanced deeper political
cooperation and cooperation in security and defense among its member-states.” By
this, the authors mean regional security and defense “outside the Inter-American”
[OAS] system” and in economic matters not included trade but instead
“infrastructure, energy, financial cooperation, and social issues” (Briceño-Ruiz and
Hoffmann, 2015: 1-2). Emphasizing the autonomous and innovative nature of
UNASUR again was the fact that the organization was primarily constituted not only

23

Almost immediately after the first announcement of CDS it became a regular feature mentioned in tandem
with UNASUR and very soon after was subsumed by UNASUR and became one UNASUR’s most active
subgroups (Sanahuja, 2012: 17-20).
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to deal with crises at hand but most significantly on “hemispheric security
architecture” based regionally (i.e., exclusively Latin America) outside of the
framework of the North American dominated Organization of American States and
the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) (Sanahuja, 2012: 17).
According to UNASUR Secretary-General 2015, Ernesto Samper, the continuing
and overriding goal of the CDS is “to preserve the region as a zone of peace, in the
midst of a world ravaged by wars, religious conflicts, that revive what was the Cold
War” (UNASUR/In its, 2015).
The prime mover behind UNASUR was Brazil, and its interests are clear
throughout the group’s conception and later actions, structure, etc. (Sanahuja, 2012:
16-17). Many of the interests of Brazil coincided with that of its neighbors. Among
the regionally shared thinking was that the U.S. was more of a “source of instability”
in the region than the opposite (i.e., of course, the latter and not the former is how
the U.S. would always like to be seen) and thus “using regional regimes without the
US participation could contribute more and better to regional stability and the pacific
resolution of conflicts” (Sanahuja, 2012: 18).
However, confounding this view of at least the glimmers of autonomous
organizations rivaling their subordinate cousins for precedence on the world political
scene is that virtually in tandem with frantic roll out of CDS/UNASUR to handle the
crisis at hand was the Latin American leaders reaching out with their other hand to
involve the clearly subordinate OAS (at least according to the predominant narrative
of the “mainstream media”). Though the CDS/UNASUR may have been announced
the day after the Colombian attack the first significant summit of Latin America and
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United States leaders was five days after the attack and months before the RIO
Group/21 Summit (a.k.a. an “Extraordinary Summit”) in which UNASUR was officially
agreed upon, and the first peace hand-shake between sparring leaders happened at
the OAS Summit the day before the same ceremony at the Latin
American/autonomous leaning RIO Group (Forero/Diplomats, 2008 and Facts on
File, 2008).
While there was a flurry of emergency summits at the OAS and soon after the
still emergent CDS/UNASUR “alternative” to the North-American dominated OAS,
and the more ideologically unified and radical ALBA-TCP was nowhere to be found,
at least in the mainstream media reportage. Perhaps the Colombian bombing raid
was not an ideal situation/set of circumstances due to the suddenness of the attack
and the visceral political outrage and turbulence it immediately evinced opening new
“wounds” and inflaming old ones. That said, one would be hard-pressed to find
another better opportunity for Latin America and its regional organizations to
simultaneously show regional unity in the face of internal schisms, political and
diplomatic coordination resolving differences, and wresting some counter-hegemonic
space from their North American overseers. However, this prominent opportunity
was not taken up by regional organizations of an autonomous character such as
UNASUR or ALBA-TCP but instead by the pilloried (i.e., by Latin American elites)
OSA.
Many comments to the media and the like were made by Latin American
presidents signaling their vehement opposition to Colombia’s surprise, and
unsanctioned attack against Ecuador, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez declared
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on a public broadcast to the country that “It must be said: They, the empire and its
lackeys, are war. We are peace. We are the path to peace” (Forero/Regional, 2008).
Responding to Colombian President Alvara Uribe’s allegations of the governments
of Ecuador and Venezuela secret support of FARC rebels Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa said, “I cannot accept Uribe's lies” (The Sunday/Leaders 2008).
Multiple diplomatic ties were severed between Colombia and countries which took
decisive actions in response to the illegal raid including Venezuela, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, and even militaries mobilized (e.g., by Venezuela to the Colombian
border) but the leaders could not be bothered to concretize their opposition in at
least an official declaration, emergency summit, or the like.
Interestingly enough, there was an ALBA-TCP “I Extraordinary Summit” held
in Caracas, Venezuela on April 23, 2008, more than a full month from the Colombian
military attack, at which there was a “Food Sovereignty and Security” Agreement
and a “Declaration of Solidarity to Bolivia” but not a mention of the ColombianEcuadorian crisis during this April meeting or after (Statements and Summits, 2010).
Perhaps ALBA-TCP was deferring to its larger sibling in the Latin American regional
organization familial milieu and did not want to overlap discussions facilitated by
UNASUR though even a cursory overview of ALBA-TCP’s list of meetings seems to
contradict this assessment as topics of UNASUR meetings are often duplicated by
ALBA-TCP and vice versa (Statements and Summits, 2010). Maybe, continuing
with the familial metaphor, the member countries of ALBA-TCP did not want to inject
more “bad blood” into a very incendiary topic in this always bonding and breaking
Latin American “family” (hoping that UNASUR, OAS, etc. would soothe these
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festering wounds) though, again as in the previous duplication possibility, the
grouping has interjected multiple times and vehemently on quite contentious issues
in the past. ALBA-TCP’s absence from this fractious issue is especially perplexing
because it seems a tailor-made and clear cut issue of “neo-imperialist” involvement
(i.e., by the U.S.), and its “lackey” Colombia in Latin America, an issue that one of
ALBA-TCP’s founders and fiercest proponents President Chavez was unlikely to
pass up in his orations. This anomaly, if it is indeed one, bears further investigation.
Though the absence of ALBA-TCP is perplexing, it could very well be that
while ALBA-TCP did not want “air their dirty laundry” in public, they might have very
well been do so in private. Evidence towards this could be found in secret leaked
U.S. documents publicized through Wikileaks. Towards this end is the very
interesting series of published U.S. diplomatic cables produced by the United States
Ambassador to Ecuador Heather M. Hodges, which detail her “behind the scenes”
views on meetings of UNASUR. The UNASUR meetings that Ambassador Hodges
(appointed by President George W. Bush and served from approximately October
2008 to September of 2011) observed and reported on came almost exactly one
year on from Colombia’s bombing of the FARC camp on the border with Ecuador in
August and December of 2009 and were also some of the very first UNASUR
meetings.
In Ambassador Hodges first August diplomatic cable she recounts President
Hugo Chavez’s remarks concerning what she refers to as the “U.S.-Colombia
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)” [the seven bases mentioned above deal] or
what President Chavez described as, “[the] installation of U.S. bases in Colombian
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territory” (Hodges, August 2009). During this August UNASUR meeting, it is
reported by Ambassador Hodges that President Chavez “asserted that Venezuela
felt threatened, calling the March 1, 2008, Colombian bombing of a FARC camp in
Ecuadorian territory a precursor (to future Colombian action) and complaining that
Colombia justified its extraterritorial attack as a preemptive strike” and that the
“winds of war had begun to blow” all while President of Ecuador Rafael Correa
wholeheartedly agreed (something relayed with great worry and hesitation by the
Ambassador) with these characterizations (Hodges, August 2009).
By the time of the next major UNASUR meeting in December of the same
year, Ambassador Hodges again attended and reported back to her overseers that
matters initiated in the first August meeting was continued and expanded upon in
this December meeting. Chief among the accomplishments/developments out of
this conference according to Hodges was what she refers to as agreement and
implementation of “confidence building mechanism[s], with provisions designed to
improve transparency and information sharing, provide guarantees regarding the
use and/or threat of force, and define South America as a region of peace” (Hodges,
December 2009).
It now becomes more and more apparent, through no less than the
unvarnished and unfiltered third party viewpoint of Ambassador Hodges cables, that
regional organizations were involved concurrently with the outbreak of (verbal and
emotional) hostilities in response to Colombia’s bombing of Ecuador as well as the
related issues of seven bases agreement/DCA and more broadly the incestuous and
subversive financial/military relationship between the United States and Colombia
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brought about by the institution of Plan Colombia. Even more importantly, UNASUR
built on this first involvement to diminish hostilities and prevent any outbreak of direct
military or financial (through the use of tit-for-tat economic sanctions, etc.)
confrontations post-crises.
However, while emotions and tensions between Latin American countries
were running very high during this and subsequent meetings according to the
Ambassador, and as reported by the mainstream media, this vehemently voiced
rhetoric and actions did not result in the concluding “Declaration of Quito” having any
official condemnation of the “U.S. military presence in Colombia” (Hodges, August
2009). Finally, the former President of Brazil Lula da Silva’s much more diplomatic
comments called for the countries meeting as a group with President Barack Obama
“this will only be resolved with dialogue and debate, speaking the truth; and people
will have to hear things they don't like...We need to agree on the future of UNASUR”
(Hodges, August 2009).
The lack of any official mention, much less condemnation of the DCA, and by
broader definition Colombia’s bombing of Ecuador, as well as the very diplomatic
comments of President Lula da Silva, now all seem to be much more
understandable and even logical. Heated but unofficial comments by Latin
American leaders in vociferous opposition to the DCA and Colombia’s bombing were
broadcast powerfully and far and wide. Still, an official record of this opposition was
so insignificant as to be invisible. It appears, the Latin American governing elites did
not want to add more “fuel” to a “fire” that was already threatening to lead to direct
combat between states and not solely a “war of words.” Instead of leading to a
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conflagration of disastrous results Latin American policymakers used their regional
organizations without any direct presence, involvement, or influence of traditional
hegemon the United States of America, and in so doing, catastrophe was averted.
Supranational mechanisms were put into place within the same year to hopefully
prevent matters from coming to the precipice in the future. The “behind closed
doors” nature of the debate and actions taken to resolve disputes over the DCA,
Colombia’s bombing of Ecuador, and Plan Colombia by the countries of Latin
America through their regional organizations rather than summits and official/public
declarations of the heads of state, and the fact that even this hidden debate was
only revealed through the leaking of U.S. diplomatic (no less a Bush appointee)
documents, I think only testify to the veracity, significant, and even momentous
nature of these historical moments.

Preserving Hemispheric Preeminence: Counter-Insurgency, Drug Wars, and
Anti-Terrorism

Lars Schoultz has written that there are “three interests” that have determined
the content of United States policy toward Latin America for over two centuries (at
the time of this writing)
…the need to protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands
of U.S. domestic politics, and the drive to promote U.S. economic
development. Each generation’s specific policies have changed with the
times and the circumstances, as one year’s fear of communist adventurism
yields to next year’s dismay over human rights violations, as the Big Stick
transmutes into Dollar Diplomacy and then Good Neighborliness, as
democracy and free trade vie for attention with drug trafficking and
immigration. But although the precise mix of reasons explaining United
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States policy changes continuously, these three interests remain ever present
(Schoultz, 1998: 368)

I have reproduced this entire passage because I believe that these three
interests still precisely and comprehensively describe the entirety of U.S. policies
(i.e., the unvarnished heart of the matter) towards Latin America up until the present
with very little elaboration needed. These three interests are apparent in everything
from U.S. policymaking to military aid to the U.S. spurred “regime change” from the
start of U.S. intervention in Latin America. These three motivations have all been in
the service of hegemonic “security” and “officials in Washington quickly concluded it
was important to retain control for a symbolic reason: hegemony over the region
became an indicator of U.S. credibility in international relations” and any ‘loss’ of
hegemony over the region “would be interpreted around the world as a sign of U.S.
weakness” (Schoultz, 1998: 368-369).24
Though not overtly a part of Schoultz’s tripartite interests of U.S. policymaking
Schoultz writes that no explanation of U.S. policymaking would be complete without
realizing that the mindset that governs the thinking of U.S. officials is the belief that
pervades the entire political establishment that Latin Americans “are an inferior
people” (Schoultz, 1998: 374-375). Ethnocentrism and prejudice have been facts of
U.S. politics since the founding of the country and are so pervasive to be considered
nearly universal and part of human nature (Schoultz, 1998: 375). At the time of the
inception of political links and subsequently between the U.S. and the region
historical events in Latin America conspired to reinforce the reflexive racism of

24

These last thoughts hearken strongly back to a variation of the threat of the Chomskyian idea of a “good
example” (see page 27) yet again.
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American politicians into the enduring discrimination that exists until today to tarnish
all thought and actions and justify the continued hegemony (inc. military intervention,
etc.) and neglect that has characterized all interactions between U.S. officials and
their counterparts in Latin America (Schoultz, 1998: 375).
An essential part of maintaining U.S. security has been the control of the
region/hegemony by the United States of America, and counterinsurgency has been
an essential part of this at least since the beginning or mid 20 th century. Still, the
ancestral roots of this strategic policymaking go back much further. Beyond the
North American context, Beatrice Heuser traces counterinsurgency (COIN) to almost
the beginning of written human history or what she calls “classical COIN literature” in
the writings of Sextus Iulius Frontinus (a.k.a. Sextus Julius Frontinus) circa 35 AD a
Roman Empire soldier, senator, and governor (among other things) who “listed
examples where the generous treatment of populations of conquered regions,
including even rebel cities, had led to winning their allegiance” (Heuser, 2012: 4).
However, more will be familiar with the infamous and innumerable U.S. history of
military and political interventions in Latin America over the past century with
counterinsurgency and hemispheric wide containment and rolling back (where
possible) of “democratic and popular” moments and movements throughout Latin
America prominent25 (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 78).

25

Of course, counterinsurgency is a tool of foreign policy of the United States still in use in the current day far
outside the confines of Latin America. For example, in the South East Asian Philippine context at the time of
this writing a The International Peoples’ Tribunal is being held to “[focus] on cases of torture and extrajudicial
killings in counterinsurgency operations” in the hope of drawing attention to and broadening this “no binding
power” investigation into holding the “U.S. and Philippine governments accountable for alleged human rights
violations” (teleSUR/bh-CM, 2015).
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United States intervention in Latin America includes the most recent (as of
this writing) executive orders declaring a ‘national emergency’ and ‘an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’
by Venezuela smacking of domestic and international politics26, to the atrocious
“policy of supporting dictatorships and death squads under the aegis of the School of
the Americas,” through counterinsurgency training including torture and
psychological warfare, to the regional such as “Operation Condor, which was set up
in 1975 by Latin American governments, in collaboration with Washington, to hunt
down and assassinate [thousands of] left-wing politicians and activists” (Grandin,
2015; Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 44). Counterinsurgency is just one
of the many foreign policy tools at the disposal of the United States of America to
serve its overwhelming interest in retaining its “undisputed supremacy” in the “global
military arena” propped up by “the equivalent of half the world’s defense spending,”
a ‘revolution of military affairs,’ “military presence without precedence on a global
scale,” and the “maintenance of the criteria of unilateral military intervention in cases
that affect the interests of national security” (Vivares 2014: 183).
I think that one of the better theoretical understandings of this regional
hegemonic control in the current day is that of the “American World Order”27 [AWO]
and a “claim about the sweeping and as-yet-unfinished U.S. hegemony in world

26

Timing and political context was very significant in both instances as this was immediately following U.S.
Republican Party gains in mid-term elections and virtually simultaneous with the U.S. push for normalization
of ties with Cuba. Of course, this severely bungled declaration of Venezuela (meant to signal the initiation of
sanctions by the U.S. on Venezuela not to mention “intensely concerned about demonstrating their own and
the nation's toughness”) backfired almost immediately with massive diplomatic fallout in the region against
the U.S. (though by this time the already patchwork diplomatic quilt was reduced to tattered and fragile
remnants) and did not have its intended results (Miroff and DeYoung, 2015 and Jay, 2015).
27
Almost interchangeably also as the ‘American-led liberal hegemonic order’
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politics” and “built around a world of territorially bounded nation-states, although its
respect for state sovereignty can be overstated” (Acharya, 2014: 2). Going further in
describing this, AWO Amitav Acharya (by way of John King Fairbank’s) amusingly
compares and contrasts it to the “Chinese World Order” writing that both have an
‘…abiding sense of superiority and hierarchy’ and that the international system was
‘given order and unity by the universal presence’ of the leading power, and one of
the final, but one of the most important parts of this understanding, was a
constructed and propagated “narrative of peacefulness and [hegemonic]
benevolence” providing “global public goods such as trade, security, and multilateral
cooperation and the hegemon’s sacrifices from incurring trade imbalances to
shedding blood for foreigners” (Acharya, 2014: 2-3).
However, this “hegemonic benevolence” (a contradiction in terms if ever there
was one) was never as “benevolent as its supporters presented it to be” (Acharya,
2014: 3). As the human rights organization Amnesty International wrote in 1996,
“[t]hroughout the world, on any given day, a man, woman or child is likely to be
displaced, tortured, killed or ‘disappeared,’ at the hands of governments or armed
political groups. More often than not, the United States shares the blame” (Blum,
2000: Opening Quotes). Or, said in a more understated but still powerful way, for
the U.S. to “provide military aid [a.k.a. support for counter-insurgency] to a
government that bases its existence upon the repression of its citizens’ human rights
is to support the repression of human rights” (Schoultz, 1981: 247).
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The history of counter-insurgency in Latin America by the United States starts
at least as far back as 193928 in the “Panama Canal Zone” (created by U.S. military
seizure) at a “variety of military bases” where the United States “trained Latin
Americans [military personnel]” in anti-communist stridency, resources, and very
soon after a re-dedication (and re-naming as the School of the Americas) to
counterinsurgency training to both military and police forces of Latin America in 1963
as a reaction to the Cuban Revolution (Gill, 2004: 26). The successful Cuban
Revolution resulted in the U.S. becoming “increasingly concerned with political

28

Classified leaked documents from the United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) actually give 1946
as the official start of what would become the School of the Americas and currently known as Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) (Grimmett and Sullivan, 2001). According to the
CRS, in 1946 the School of the Americas was called the “Latin American Center—Ground Division” (Grimmett
and Sullivan, 2001).
Of course, beyond counter-insurgency there is the broader issue of military assistance as a United States tool
of foreign policy something which Lars Schoultz has studied at length. According to Schoultz military
assistance to foreign militaries began at the time of the Spanish American War by training “Cuban soldiers
following that nation’s independence in 1902” (Schoultz, 1981: 212). In terms of military assistance to South
America that more actively started to blur any lines between military assistance in general and that going
towards counter-insurgency began in 1920 when “Congress granted the executive branch broad authority” to
assist various governments of South America in ‘naval matters’ by ‘detail[ing] officers’ to advise the navies of
these governments (Schoultz, 1981: 212).
It must also be noted here that the United States penchant for supporting counter-insurgency abroad is
demonstrable this is not to say it is completely uninterrupted. Perhaps, there were times during U.S. history
when there was an ebb in this push by policymakers to support dictators, despots, and war criminals due to
what some policymakers called an “attenuation” of relations between the U.S. and their “usual
suspects”/recipients of military aid/counter-insurgency because of the Carter administrations pulling back
from previous commitments due to an aversion to be associated with U.S. former allies because of their
newfound focus on “strong human rights policy” (Schoultz, 1981: 362-363). However, though there may have
been moments of flux in U.S.’s stream of weapons and military advisors to some of the worst Western
hemispheric actors this did not lead to a sudden “greater respect” for the “physical integrity of the person”
but instead any seeming decrease in “gross violations” of human rights could be traced to a preceding decline
in “threats to the established structure of privilege” or simply because there were “too few people left to
intimidate [disappear, slaughter, etc.]” (Schoultz, 1981: 355). In addition, there was a list of U.S. domestic
factors during the late 1970’s period including the collapse of the Nixon administration who were primary
authors of “discredited beyond redemption” governments/actions of the Pinochet regime in Chile and a newly
elected “liberal Congress” to punish U.S. conservatives also tied to these now briefly reviled support for
human rights violators (Schoultz, 1981: 372). The final factor in this list that “influenced the success of the
human rights movement” during this period in North American history was simply that “there was no credible
threat to United States security in Latin America (Schoultz, 1981: 372).
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mobilization of the masses and political movements that might…become radicalized
as they struggled to break away from the stultifying economic and social structures
that had condemned the vast majority of Latin Americans to poverty and suffering”
(Vanden, 2002: 61). And, to that end, “military training in places like the School of
the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone and aid to Latin American militaries was
greatly increased” very soon after 1960 in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution
(Vanden, 2002: 61). Of course, U.S. support for foreign military personnel
(especially of Latin American origin) goes far beyond this one significant uptick in
military training and aid after and 1960. Also, it is far larger than the formerly named
School of the Americas now, including over 100,000 foreign soldiers from over 150
countries at the cost of tens of millions of dollars in over 275 military installations
across the United States (Amnesty International, 2015).
These foreign (i.e., Latin American) soldiers and police are trained in
everything from “counter-insurgency, infantry tactics, military intelligence, antinarcotics operations and commando operations” as well as being taught to “hate and
fear something called ‘communism,’ later something called ‘terrorism,’ with little, if
any, distinction made between the two” (Blum, 2000: 61). As Lars Schoultz
explains, during the post-World War II era (specifically between the end of WWII and
the late 1950s) threats to the U.S. have been perceived as the menace of
“extrahemispheric communist aggression” and after the Cuban revolution turned
strongly towards helping Latin American countries to defend against the ‘danger of
internal subversion,’ and then gradually transforming from the 1960s on “beyond
rural counterinsurgency to a more generalized internal security capability” (Schoultz,
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1981: 217-219). Widespread public opposition led to pressure on the U.S. Congress
for action and consequent legislative maneuvers threatening at least five different
funding cuts in as many years to the SOA/WHINSEC. Still, all were unsuccessful in
1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, and 1999 (Grimmett and Sullivan, 2001). However, while
legislative financial support survived with very little change, ostensibly public outcry
led to the infamous name change of the embattled SOA to WHINSEC October 30,
2000,29 which while a small gesture did at least acknowledge the long-running
opposition and horrendous publicity of this military training facility (Grimmett and
Sullivan, 2001).
Plan Colombia and related programs of financial and military assistance to
other countries by the United States are all about serving U.S. foreign policy agenda
by making way for and growing “access” to foreign country allies which results in an
enviable mix of “personal connections, personal information [of foreign military
personnel], country databases – indispensable assets in time of coup, counter-coup,
revolution, counter-revolution or invasion” (Blum, 2000: 64). Further, as Lars
Schoultz makes clear, the purpose of military assistance “has always been to assist
friendly governments to defend themselves against threats to the national security of
the United States” another definition of counter-insurgency if ever one is needed
(Schoultz, 1981: 216). This “winning” mix explains the Pentagon’s continuing strong
momentum towards continuing and even expanding these programs “in the face of
decades of terrible publicity [mass slaughter of unarmed civilians], increasingly more
militant protests, thousands of arrests, and sharply decreasing Congressional

29

This timing came only a few weeks from the large annual protest/vigil against the school led by the activist
group School of the Americas Watch
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support” (Blum, 2000: 64). As other rationales for military assistance (which should
now be conflated with counter-insurgency) disappeared, “only the goal of
maintaining access and influence with Latin America’s military establishments
remained” (Schoultz, 1981: 221).
So what is the “reality” in Colombia through the layers of diplomatese, the
distorted lens of counter-insurgency, and the pernicious, vicious, and even more
hidden other end of this sword? According to human rights and activist groups, like
Witness for Peace, the reality of Colombia with counter-insurgency still going strong
through U.S. support is “violent non-state actors to effect mass
displacements...freeing up land for multinational corporations in the name of
‘development,’ a proposal tacitly supported by the Colombian state” (Taylor, 2014).
In Mexico, according to another similar advocacy group, the School of the Americas
Watch, the on-the-ground reality of the counter-insurgency focused ‘drug war’ is
similarly “to create violence, confusion, and disorder so as to destroy the social
fabric and organized people that stand in the way of profits for multinational business
– whether legal or illegal, whether drugs, gold mining, organs, silver, guns, or other
profit-making enterprise” (SOA Watch, July 2015). Innumerable other examples
from other states similarly destabilized by the consequences of coup d'etat’s (though
this terminology is of course contested by those currently in power) and their
supposedly now legitimate governments (e.g., Honduras and Paraguay), drug
trafficking and of course U.S. influence through close military ties, financial support,
neoliberal trade deals, and counter-insurgency (or a mix of all these things) where
the patterns seen in Colombia and Mexico are also apparent and need to be
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academically analyzed in much further depth (where they have been analyzed at all)
for their potential causes, actors, etc.
While these activist groups do not act in a concerted way and are
supranational regional organizations in the way of UNASUR or ALBA-TCP, they are
perhaps “cousins” that still can “set the stage” for the current realities that many
people throughout Latin America are living whether or not their stories are told,
listened to, and analyzed. However, what roles and influence do regional
organizations such as ALBA-TCP play in any of these messy realities?
When regional organizations are inserted into this mix of hegemonic control
through military aid and direct counter-insurgency training of foreign soldiers both
abroad within subordinate countries and domestically within the U.S., this concoction
becomes even more murky, convoluted, and interesting. Further study of U.S.
diplomatic cables makes clear again (as in my previous discussion of the DCA, Plan
Colombia, and the influence of Latin America’s regional organizations) that the
influence of more autonomous regional organizations of Latin America is
acknowledged even in the mealy-mouthed ways of the U.S. diplomatic corps.
It could be argued that any mention of Latin American regional groupings in
U.S. diplomatic cables bodes well as an indication of their influence on regional
affairs and even for their political autonomy vis-à-vis the United States of America.
Particularly of note for my hypothesis, would be negative mentions of regional
groupings in diplomatic cables (and related primary documents) in some ways
transmitting everything from annoyance to outright fear and hostility towards these
groups and in this way ironically further signifying these groups autonomy from the
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U.S., their influence to the detriment of the U.S., and the significance of their
regional and international relations recognized by the U.S. in its role as regional and
worldwide hegemon and unipolar power.
Many of the mentions in diplomatic cables of UNASUR have tended towards
concern on the part of diplomatic staff to veiled annoyance. In this vein, there is the
summary of the August 28, 2009 UNASUR meeting in Argentina. It is very important
to note the timing and context of this document only a few months removed from a
dramatic increase in tensions throughout Latin America caused by the Colombian
government’s decision to attack a FARC encampment in neighboring Ecuador, with
the pending DCA base deal still winding its way through the Colombian judiciary,
and the longstanding and huge increase in U.S. military and financial support to
Colombia by the U.S. under the auspices of Plan Colombia not only arguably
emboldening and provoking Colombia towards much greater military aggressiveness
regionally but also exacerbating regional political tensions.
This diplomatic summary of the mid-2009 UNASUR meeting seems relieved
when its author mentions that their former stalwart ally in Colombia former President
Uribe was able to “prevent the group from condemning the DCA” but evinced
concern that “many South American Presidents expressed reservations about the
regional implications of the agreement” and especially the final UNASUR declaration
that “included language that foreign military forces cannot ‘threaten the sovereignty
or integrity of any South American nation and the peace and security of the region’
(Nichols, 2009).
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CONCLUSION

I have covered a lot of ground throughout this chapter describing the
hegemonic versus subordinate dynamic exemplified by the United States of America
in the traditional hegemonic role and the subordinate “enforcer” and laboratory of
U.S. military and economic experimentation. The second major section of this
portion of my thesis focused on the military and diplomatic fracas that ensued with
Colombia’s aerial bombing attack of a remote border area of Ecuador that the
Colombian guerilla/terrorist group had encamped at and the role of autonomous
LATAM regional organizations in defusing the crisis apart from those traditional
interlocutor regional organizations such as the O.A.S. which are viewed as
“compromised” and “subordinate” by many of the LATAM states.
Other than Wikileaks releases from U.S. diplomatic staff, what is the evidence
is that Latin American regional organizations had any impact on hegemony in one
way or another? Admittedly, there has not been a wealth of evidence in one
direction or another that is readily obvious. Journalistic accounts show little if any
mention of regional organizations directly, and when they do, often undercut their
significance and emphasize negative examples (Ghitis, 2014). The Wikileaks
releases have also not had any clear corroboration of the impact of autonomous
regional organizations.
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CHAPTER 3:
EXTRA-HEGEMON[IC] POWERS

Up until this point I have been arguing for and seeking out evidence that
regional and other supranational international organizations are collectively coming
together in some ways to try at least to offset/resist, and at most to start to
counteract, U.S. hegemony and all that entails militarily, economically, etc.
worldwide. I will continue further along this road by now questioning the role, if any,
of external (i.e., outside of Latin America and the Western Hemisphere; a.k.a. extraWestern) regional organizations and any impacts of their interventions within the
international political and policymaking arena. For my purposes, we will focus on
states and organizations outside of the Western Hemisphere, which are, and have
been, actively intervening within Latin America within approximately the past two
decades. I will first briefly sketch out the extra-Western powers in question for this
paper and how they might have influenced politics and the “soft-power” projection of
Latin America globally. This Third World emancipation and liberation might appear
differently to varied viewers.
For instance, to some global South struggle towards emancipation from
global Northern hegemony, Latin American small and middle powers might be
resurgent, “wrestling,” and sometimes winning over their colonialist/imperialist
legacies. Latin America and ALBA-TCP were important in the demise of the FTAA
propelled forward by a newly resurgent U.S. coming off their recent ratification of
NAFTA earlier in the same year as the FTAA was first proposed (López and Mc
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Donagh, 2016). Actions like these show a renewed promise by potentially
autonomous states to shedding their subservience to hegemonic rule. However, did
these renewed counterhegemonic movements include any involvement of more
autonomous groups like BRICS, etc.? If so, what if anything was their role?
I will seek to answer several questions in the course of this chapter. If these
outside organizations in Latin America are propagating counter-hegemony then what
does counter-hegemony mean in these instances (examples and studies of each, for
instance, ALBA-TCP set up as a rebuke of neoliberally and “exploitive” – in the view
of opposing states – “free trade agreements” with the United States of America) and
what if anything does this mean for internal/regional organizations like UNASUR and
ALBA-TCP? If there is something here, is this purely a Latin American
phenomenon, or is this dynamic happening elsewhere? Is this counter-hegemonic
turn in Latin America growing an alliance with these external organizations and
external powers? Finally, if there is a counter-hegemonic turn in Latin America and
outside organizations are involved, I will identify some of the most prominent
example organizations.

BRICS

Terminology is very important and contested in the nomenclature, labeling,
and definitions surrounding groups of countries or descriptions of these individual
countries. Perhaps, even more so than in other scholarly areas talk of Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) as a distinct and cohesive “regional”
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or extra-regional group is very significant and much-contested as are referenced by
some to Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and
Turkey as “emerging powers,” “rising powers,” not to mention part of the “global
South” or “third world” particularly since these “uncertain and contested
categorizations…affect the discussion of their role in the world governance and
order” (Acharya, 2014: 59-60).
That I and others think of the BRICS as a group with counter-hegemonic
potential is very unusual when one documents the genesis of this group, which
appears as anything but counter-hegemonic. One origin point, which is widely
known by observers, in 2001, a Goldman Sachs analyst first coined the term BRIC
(later to be enlarged by the addition of South Africa adding on the “S”) (Ferdinand,
2014: 376). What may be less known by many is that one of the major next steps in
actually gathering the leaders of these physically together was in 2007 at the behest
of the G830 which invited the leaders of these countries to join their summit “to try to
stimulate cooperation between the developed and the developing world in a
relatively small, business-like forum [and] spotlighted these states as leading
representatives of the developing world” simultaneously putting the BRICS on a
world stage “pedestal” and inadvertently leading to their increasing cohesion
culminating in the group and its accomplishments to date (Ferdinand, 2014: 377). I
use the word inadvertently because while the attendance as a part of the G8 (the
children at the adult's table) was meant to pigeonhole them into the role of businesslike elder statesman of the developing world, it led the BRICS to start to meet
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annually separately from the G8 and in contradiction of these stultified goals of the
global North as represented by the G8 and broadening to unapproved things such
as “regular ministerial meetings too, focusing on trade, health, energy and
agriculture...an important advisory business council to promote trade between
them...[as well as] the BRICS development bank [and most importantly for my
purposes] an ‘alternative conﬁguration of world governance’” (Ferdinand, 2014: 377).
Some scholars seek to point out the contradictions of developing countries to
define the global “South” and what that might mean today. While I will briefly
engage with these lines of analysis, my main intent remains to get at any
autonomous, emancipatory, or liberatory characteristics from U.S. hegemony that
might become apparent. Though the appeal of groups like the BRICS are that they
are made up of countries such as Brazil and China which have sometimes seemed
to be charting a course separate from North American hegemony both military and
economical we must look deeper than these official pronouncements to see other
motives and specifically if they are seeking to create counter-hegemonic leeway or
something else entirely.
Certainly, there is a difference of opinion amongst scholars about the BRICS
organization and their projects, with one hastening to say that the general public that
the BRICS are “doing on the government level what Occupy Wall Street has been
advocating [locally]” in their launching of a BRICS developmental bank while in the
same article an opposing expert opines that “it is designed to give these large
developing capitalist countries more room for maneuver vis-à-vis the American state
and the European Central Bank and the IMF and the World Bank” while still a “very
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conventional development bank” operating (when it is operational) according to
neoliberal market principles just as its conventional cousin banks do and that this is
by the graphic design of Brazil and China whose counter-hegemonic potential has
severely called into question for many different reasons (New BRICS, 2014).
However, those that ascribe to a firmly positive view of the cohesiveness, substance,
and counter-hegemonic (or at least norm changing) potential of the BRICS and their
variants such as BRICSAM (i.e., BRICS but including Mexico) put forward the
forecasted statistic that BRICSAM GDP will be greater than OECD [a grouping of 34
countries including most of Europe, Scandanavian, and the U.K. and the U.S.] “by
2045” and their “purchasing power parity will exceed it in 2015” (Alden, Morphet, and
Antonio, 2010: 122). As we shall see, perhaps the “truth” is something other than
the polar extremes of positivity or negativity of the contending debaters’ quoted
earlier or implied by the statistics mentioned above.
Amitav Acharya calls into question the self-selecting and based on “traditional
indices of power, or material capabilities” membership of groups like BRICS and the
much broader U.N. grouping of “developing” countries in the G-20 but writes that
these groupings leave out many countries stronger in “global and regional leadership
role[s], past and present” and “soft power31, or leadership in ideas, innovation, and
problem-solving, or what might be called intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership”
ultimately calling into question the meaningfulness of terms such as “emerging
powers” as a “new force in world politics” (Acharya, 2014: 61). Certainly, the
membership of the BRICS is much more self-selective (by design) and arbitrary than

31

An alternate, and more traditional definition of “soft power” by Joseph Nye is, “the ability to get what you
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (BBC China Power Audit, 2015).
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for instance United Nation’s groupings of similar (mostly developing) countries like
the Group of 77 (G77) and does not include many countries, but this does not
necessarily negate the effectiveness and influence of this grouping.
Another observation noted within academia is the BRICS predominance
within the academic scholarship as well as journalistic coverage, which far outstrips
its actual “footprint.” For a variety of reasons, “large developed countries” (LDCs)
and groups such as BRICS have been emphasized thus far in much of the literature.
One of the reasons for this emphasis on LDCs/BRICS is that “Anglophone academic
literature, certainly over the 2000s, was empirically never justified and may have
been geopolitically motivated in accordance with Western/Northern interests” to the
explicit detriment and exclusion of organizations and examples of “South-South
cooperation as Third World emancipation and liberation”32 (Muhr, 2015: 4,6). In
other words, a very important part of any analysis of global Southern counterhegemony real or potential should always be aware of and actively “counter the
Western-centric bias in the production of knowledge about South-South cooperation”
(Muhr, 2015: 2).
Attempting to show the massive, disparate, and arbitrary BRICS
autonomous/counter-hegemonic/multi-polar influence on the foreign policy of
member countries or events is a tremendously difficult order. Still, some have tried
by analyzing the U.N. voting behavior of BRICS countries on their “long-term foreign
policy convergence to determine how far they adopt similar positions on world

32

Also to be kept in mind are that there are three other South-South cooperation principles of
‘complementation,’ ‘cooperation,’ and ‘solidarity,’ established in the Group of 77 (G-77) Charter of Algiers of
1967 (Muhr, 2015: 2).

75 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

issues” (Ferdinand, 2014: 376, 378). Even the very preliminary results of this
analysis of the U.N. voting behavior of BRICS countries revealed that “BRICS vote
the same way as each other at least 70% of the time, while they vote the opposite
way to the USA at least half the time” and this at the very least “suggests a different
conception of the purpose, role and practice of diplomacy at the UN held by BRICS
from that of the USA, France and the UK” (Ferdinand, 2014: 380). Thus far, it
seems that there may be more cohesion and political autonomy to the BRICS then
initial observations of the disparity and arbitrary nature of the grouping seem to show
many observers.
However, dissension within BRICS ranks is also rife as foreign policy
coordination on issues such as Libya and Syria has been noticeably lacking since
the growth of the BRICS as a more cohesive group (Chan, 2011; Ferdinand, 2014:
378). There are also significant disparities economically and politically as well as in
their nuclear weapons policies (Acharya, 2014: 64-65). The chief focus and some
might say the accomplishment of the BRICS, has been on the subject of “global
reordering” from a unipolar to a multipolar world and governing/administrative
systems such as the United Nations. Still, it is especially on the topic of reordering
from “climate change to UN Security Council reform” where significant differences
between the varied BRICS states arise vociferously leading many analysts to
question whether there is enough “cement to hold them together” or whether the
BRICS membership is more of a “status symbol” and “way of attracting attention
from foreign investors” (Acharya, 2014: 64-65).
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Far from the general media and academic sensation that is the BRICS one
analyst argues that “perhaps a more credible agent for reshaping global
governance” because of its clear advantages in terms of combined economic and
people power not to mention being credited with ‘implementing the largest
coordinated macroeconomic stimulus in history, which has successfully arrested
[this is debatably true] a potentially deep global recession’ (Acharya, 2014: 65).
However, even this analyst who is potentially more positive about the G-20’s
chances to effect change globally admits that the “political and practical obstacles to
making global institutions more democratic and inclusive are huge” due to resistance
from the West/North as well as “disunity within the ranks” and “uncertainties
concerning its institutionalization” and “lack of continuity from one summit to the
next” (Acharya, 2014: 67).

STRESS TESTS: LIBYA AND BEYOND

More importantly, than the preceding issues have on the BRICS, and its
member countries (i.e., as potentially very significant tipping political and diplomatic
counterweights that they are internationally and regionally) respectively impact
domestic and foreign policy within Latin America and particularly have these effects
been tending towards increasing political autonomy or reproducing subservience?
The case of Libya and extra-organizations response to this fractious foreign policy
situation is a good way to test BRICS response (and a semblance of Latin America’s
via the proxy of Brazil). Later I will also delve through the BRICS leaders collectively
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agreed upon “Joint Statements” released after their annual summits for more data
on their thinking and positions beyond Libya to hint at the group tendency (if any)
towards or away from hegemonic demands.
The third summit of the BRICS taking place on April 14 of 2011 was the
occasion for the general feeling of the BRICS on the U.N. legitimated intervention in
Libya to start to show itself when former South African President Thabo Mbeki
opined that “Western imperial powers…brazenly arrogated to themselves the
unilateral right to decide the future of this African country” by “imperial diktat” instead
of allowing any possibility of “Africa’s right and duty to resolve its problems” through
the African Union and other posited ways to handle this situation by Africa and the
developing world (Chan, 2011; Mbeki, 2014). There is a “prevailing perception
among some leading African intellectuals and policy-makers that the continent
remains a target for western neo-colonialism or imperialism,” and among the
preeminent cases of this in recent times has been 2011 Northern-led intervention in
Libya (Vickers, 2013: 682). How was the Western conflagration unleashed upon
Libya reacted to by the states of Latin America and the regional organizations they
were members of, and did these reactions bolster or detract from the ongoing
struggle towards political autonomy?
In one of the most recent BRICS summits taking place June 8, 2015, in
Moscow State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin addressed the assembled BRICS
parliamentarians in the first BRICS Parliamentary Forum (fostering BRICS
parliamentary cooperation) stating, a “liberal interpretation of the United Nations
Charter” and “substitution of the UN Security Council's decisions” in the U.N.
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resolutions against Libya and Kosovo “in an effort to monopolise <sic> the decisionmaking process” and “trying to promote their unipolar concept of the world through
ideological conflicts” (Matviyenko and Naryshkin, 2015).
That the Russian-led BRICS Parliamentary Forum mentioned Libya and
Kosovo as examples of Northern monopolization of U.N. decision-making and
unipolarity “through ideological conflicts” is a very strong indication of Russia’s
resistance to Northern hegemony. However, at the same time, we should look
skeptically at the significance of parliamentarian’s declarations, especially those
from Russia (not known for a particularly strong parliament) and not from BRICS
leaders, which can be backed up by executive action.
The annual Joint Statement(s) (J.S.) of the BRIC Countries Leaders from
2009 to 2015 are some of the most substantial and relevant collective statements
that help to ascertain the views of the BRICS on international politics and foreign
policy in their own words. The 2009 Joint Statement coming as it was in the still
turbulent reverberating wake of the U.S. financial crises (soon to spread globally)
was obviously and rightly focused on the disastrous aftereffects of this sparing
mention of foreign policy in an almost “boilerplate” manner only in points 12 – 15 of
the 15 point statement.
In these concluding foreign policy statements of the J.S., there were no bold
pronouncements but instead careful statements familiar to those that follow BRICS
(and their members) press releases and the like. For instance, in point 12, there
was a joint statement that the BRICS “support…a more democratic and just multipolar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect,
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cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states” and
“disputes in international relations [through] political and diplomatic efforts” (2009,
BRICS First Summit). Generalities and what passes for unexceptional rhetoric thus
far interesting as a counter positioned world order to that hegemonic U.S.-led “order”
increasingly in tatters and full of strife between states, outright war, and economic
collapse.
Point 13 of the BRICS First Summit was more of the same bland statements
focused only on a condemnation of terrorism, “in all its forms and manifestations and
reiterate that there can be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere or for
whatever reasons” (2009, BRICS First Summit). Point 14 emphasized BRICS
intentions to make the U.N. the predominant institution of choice for dealing with all
“global challenges and threats” and a commitment to “multilateral diplomacy” and
structural changes to the U.N. long proposed by many in the global South (e.g.,
expansion of the Security Council to include more “emerging” or developing
members) with very little movement or even agreement among even its proponents
on these changes to the U.N. such as which countries should be a part of this
expansion (Acharya, 2014: 109-110).
This first summit of the BRICS sets out some counterhegemonic outlines in
terms of changes it calls for to create/found a “multi-polar world order” based on
“multi-lateral diplomacy” both subtle rejections of the current U.S.-led/Global
Northern hegemony and multiple recent examples of instances (North American
Treat Alliance – NATO coordinated attack of Kosovo in 1999 and U.N. legitimized
attack of Libya 2011) where multi-polarity and multilateralism were not on display.
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The second summit with a “Leaders’ Declaration and Action Plans” in 2010
sees a much more lengthy and organized list of points (33 in total) with
“transformations in global governance” now as Point #1 and a “multipolar, equitable
and democratic world order” #2 respectively signifying the tremendously changing
priorities of the BRICS the year after the first summit (2010, BRICS Second
Summit). The Third Summit was a collection of thirty-two points and twenty-three
subdivided “Action Plans” with the important items the addition of South Africa to the
BRICS, Point #4 being the 21st Century goals of “strengthening BRICS cooperation
as well as on promoting coordination on international and regional issues of common
interest,” and “enhancing multilateralism and promoting greater democracy in
international relations” as Point #5 (2010, BRICS Second Summit). The BRICS
leaders noted, “strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization, and increasing
interdependence” globally and included now-familiar statements about “democracy
in international relations” (i.e., more voice for “emerging and developing countries” in
“international affairs”) and “multilateral diplomacy” through an improved U.N. in
Points #7 and #8 (2010, BRICS Second Summit).
Another BRICS Summit (the Fourth) and another differently organized “Joint
Statement” now with fifty points and seventeen “Action Plans” (2012, BRICS Fourth
Summit). Most of this Fourth Summit (see Points #2, 4-13, 15-18, 34, 38, and 47)
was focused on a mix of “global financial architecture,” “trade relations,”
development of the global economy and particularly the national economies and
interests of the “emerging” countries in this milieu (2012, BRICS Fourth Summit).
The sparse potential counter-hegemonic mentions within the document were found
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only within Point #3 when the BRICS leaders hope for a “multi-polar” world and Point
#4 where the goal of the BRICS was strengthened global governance through
institutions of note (2012, BRICS Fourth Summit).
Speaking of strengthened global institutional governance, the institutions
mentioned throughout the points dealing with the “global financial architecture”
included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G20, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) hardly bastions of counter-hegemony and culminated with
support for the “Doha Round”33 of WTO trade negotiations to “lower trade barriers
around the world, and thus facilitate increased global trade” (2012, BRICS Fourth
Summit). The BRICS were increasingly treading very grey and blurry lines between
submitting to hegemony and their counter-hegemonic tendencies (often pushed on
them by their constituents).
These multiple contradictions were shown on the one hand in the supportive
mentions of clearly hegemonic institutions (IMF, WTO, G20, etc.) and their
associated processes (i.e., Doha Round) reproducing dependency and other
examples of subservience to Northern institutional and economic strictures. On the
other hand, BRICS tread the line of potentially counter-hegemonic items such as the
founding of the BRICS Development Bank (meant to be an alternative to the IMF),
and individual countries of the BRICS debatably had a hand in the breakdown of the
very (Doha) talks they supposedly supported as a group. Cognizant of the North’s
role in the variety of economic crises afflicting developing countries and what they

33

“The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) aims to reduce trade barriers and assist developing countries
through trade liberalization [and has been] characterized by differences between the United States, the
European Union, and developing countries on major issues” resulting in subsequent meetings which were
generally acknowledged as fruitless and in the DDA still not culminating in any final agreement (Kurian, 2011).
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should do to help put a stop to these crises, all show the contradictory nature of the
BRICS while at the same time pointing to signs of potential counter-hegemony
(2012, BRICS Fourth Summit; Desai and Vreeland, 2014). The torn nature, and at
the same time “keeping all options on the table,” of the BRICS are again shown in
Points #5 - #13 where the BRICS leaders simultaneously call for an increased voice
in the IMF, World Bank, and other Northern led global financial institutions
(something they have been calling for a very long time) and then right after in Point
#13 declare their intention to start researching the possibility of setting up their own
global Bank as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank and all of the deleterious
and harsh austerity and other economic “pain” they often call for in developing
countries that submit to their “services” (2012, BRICS Fourth Summit).

BEYOND THE BRICS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, AND CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA

Aside from the BRICS collectively, the undisputed extra-hegemonic powers
that individually make up the group are Brazil, Russia, and China, and the Latin
American region have long been a foreign policy priority of all countries much longer
than the BRICS was even an embryonic idea. In the decades since the Cold War
dynamics have changed considerably, and yet some have remained very similar.
No longer is Latin America in an abased position to the United States of America but
is now “actively being courted by different powers, with Moscow regaining a
prominent role in western hemispheric affairs,” and I can now very justifiably add
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China to this statement (Sanchez, 2015: 362). Brazil’s main role in the region is as a
local aspiring hegemon.

BRAZIL

Even in terms of its sheer size, numbers, and geography, Brazil dominates
the continent of South America and overall within the Latin American region.
Indeed, one scholar calls them a “giant” among nations as one of the “fourth-largest
in the area [of South America],” the third-largest democracy, and the largest Catholic
country” and with over 170 million people consists of “half of South America’s
population and the “fifth largest in the world” (Vanden, 2002: 483). In 2002 Brazil
was rated as the “eighth largest in the world” exceeding at that time Russia, Canada,
and Great Britain” (Vanden, 2002: 484). If only by these statistics and standards,
can one understand why Brazil would naturally aspire to a regional hegemonic
position. As scholar Wilber Albert Chaffee wrote in 2002,
“Brazil is a nation of superlatives, but one that threatens the nation is the
reality of the greatest wealth and income inequality among major nations of
the world. The great question is whether Brazil’s democracy and economic
reforms can be maintained and advanced at the same time that great
problems remain. Can successive governments pay the “social debt”
(Vanden, 2002: 509)?

With an understanding of the above problems mentioned in the passage and
events since then, one can see that not much has changed. Since the 2002 time of
this writing the Brazilian Congress and other power elites throughout Brazil, etc.
have swiftly pushed through the impeachment (many observers have instead called
it a coup) of democratically elected President of Brazil Dilma Vana Rousseff in 2016,
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the jailing of extremely popular former President “Lula” who was running for a
second term, the election of Jair Bolsonaro as President (called by many a “fascist”),
and the ouster and arrest of the interim/“caretaker” President Temer in 2019. The
Odebrecht transnational company scandals may have begun in Brazil (where the
company was founded and based) but have riven “scorched earth” style throughout
Latin America taking down the highest political and corporate executives and show
no signs of ending any time soon (AFP, 2019; Graham-Harrison, 2017; Fishman and
de Santi, 2019; Kaiser and McGowan, 2019; Watson, 2017).
Brazil has been analyzed as a “consensual hegemon” (“the consensual
approach draws on Gramscian suggestions that a hegemony gains its strength
through consent, not the latent threat of imposition”) by one scholar writing that
regionally Brazil is “predominant, but not dominant” and recognizing this Brazil seeks
to “push a regional or international system in a given direction” and in this way how
Brazil with “limited military and economic power capabilities might attempt to
leverage its idea-generating capacity to construct a vision of the regional system and
quietly obtain the active acquiescence of other regional states to a hegemonic
project” (Burges, 2008: 65).
Given the political turmoil in the world and especially in Brazil at this time (at
the time of this writing three different Brazilian presidents within the extremely brief
span of five years, with the most recently elected after a series of coup-like
bordering on illegitimate elections, not to mention the instability of the current
Bolsonaro regime) it is likely that Brazil’s elites dream of regional hegemony have
been pushed even further down the historical timeline into the mid to late 21 st
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century if it does come to pass (Turner, 1991: 476). Most of the painstaking coalition
building towards regional integration and other international group involvement and
organizing such as UNASUR, MERCOSUR, etc. under the Bolsonaro regime has
come to a very rapid halt where if the organizations are not already in the process of
being disbanded, they have suspended members/countries, etc. (Bragatti, 2019: 7071).
Of course, all of the above instability in Brazil and more specifically Bolsonaro
has meant that if during the Lula years of from 2003 to 2010 where Brazilian
diplomacy and presence on the world stage was advancing closer to the hegemonic
(“consensual” or otherwise) from its membership within UNASUR and similar
organizations which excluded the United States from membership, its role as
“peacekeeper” nation in Haiti (as troublesome and debatable the benefits of this
position), international trade, role in diplomacy and “peace-making” between
countries within Latin-America, etc. Under Bolsonaro, all of this has steadily been
crumbling like a house of cards and in the wake of various chicaneries of the
Brazilian elites embodied in the Brazilian government, judiciary, etc. (Milani,
Pinheiro, and Soares de Lima, 2017: 585-586; Harig and Kenkel, 2017: 625–641).

RUSSIA

Russian diplomatic ties with LATAM began as early as 1824 with Mexico very
soon after the country’s independence. They only increased in importance and
frequency with the passing years and momentous events such as World War I, the
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coming to power of the Soviets in Russia, and the Cold War during which time
LATAM countries sought out more contacts with the Soviet Union because “they
regarded it as…a counterweight to…U.S. dictate” (Sanchez, 2015: 363). Former
functionaries within these world powers (or at least “middle powers”) like Russia
through the person of Foreign Minister Lavrov views Latin America particularly as a
“very interesting” prospect towards making multi-polarity in international affairs real
(Blank and Kim, 2015: 162). Per Lavrov, Latin America shows great potential as a
region on the world stage pushing forwards international political multi-polarity (or
what Lavrov refers to as “independence in international affairs”) and is a “swiftly
developing region, which wants to be independent more and more" and [the region]
“certainly becomes one of [the] centers of economic growth, financial power, political
influence and forming multipolar world order” and shares many mutual concerns that
Russia has with this unipolar historical moment (Blank and Kim, 2015: 162).
Notwithstanding ministerial and policy paper statements, Russia has also
been cultivating many ties with Latin America in many different areas, including trade
and infrastructure. Unlike China, which seems predominantly focused on the
infrastructural and easing their access to natural resources, etc., Russia seems to be
interested more in military trade and projection of their military power back into Latin
America at the same time as the United States of America attention and direct
support to the region is ebbing. For example, “Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu
announced Russian plans to build military bases in Nicaragua, Cuba, and
Venezuela, marking Russia’s most forward endeavors in the region since the end of
the Cold War” (Meacham, 2014). There has been some “general commercial trade”
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[but] particularly the weapons trade” between Latin America and Russia “focusing
primarily on establishing its [Russia’s] place in the region” with Venezuela one of the
largest recipients of Russian trade “dominated by arms sales and military contracts”
(Meacham, 2014).
In 2013 “Russia and Brazil finalized a five-year deal originally signed in 2008,
netting the South American giant 12 military-grade helicopters worth about U.S.
$150 million” and later in the same year there was a visit by Russia’s Defense
Minister promoting another proposed deal “the US$1 billion sale of missile systems
that could considerably improve Brazil’s defensive capabilities,” and finally “Russia is
working out agreements to establish actual Russian military bases in at least three
countries—the most ambitious engagement in the region in the past 25 years”
(though it is important to recognize these latter gargantuan military deals still have
yet to be finalized at this time of writing) (Meacham, 2014). One analyst argues that
far from seeking a return to the Cold War international dynamic of a bi-polar world
with many competing proxy battles and states Russia in today’s Latin America is
seeking “an alternative to an unfair alliance [i.e., between regional hegemon the U.S.
and a subordinate Latin America] and at the same time institute a cooperative
multipolar international structure that allows both larger and smaller states to
participate in the processes of globalization, military cooperation, and economic
integration (COHA – Russia, 2014).
In a now largely unremarked upon event that at the very beginning of
President Chavez’s tenure in 2008, Russia flew “two strategic bombers” in
September and in November sailed “four Russian warships” to Venezuela for joint
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military exercises (Chuang, 2008: 14-15). This Russian visit was the first time that
Russian bombers of this type had “landed in the Western Hemisphere since the end
of the Cold War” (Chuang, 2008: 15). This has, however, been followed up with
many other Russian significant displays of power and projection.
In response to the ratcheting up of tensions between Washington DC and
Havana and Washington DC and Moscow for the first time in almost ten years,
Russia sent a flotilla of naval ships to dock in Havana. Several months later, in July
of the same year, Russian flotilla visits Cuba as part of a global tour. Then just a
month later, Venezuela and Russia signed a ports agreement and other cooperation
agreements covering military education, training, and joint exercises on land, air,
and sea (Cranny-Evans, 2019; Sanchez, 2019; Sanchez, 2019).
As the preceding Chinese author analyzes, this joint effort of Venezuela and
Russia was not only a “show of force” by the Russian government, military, and the
nascent Venezuelan government seeking to show its independence from traditional
hegemonic overseer the U.S., but also “to put U.S. President-elect Barack Obama
[now President Trump] on notice and create leverage for future military dialogue
between Russia and the United States” (Chuang, 2008: 15). Aside from the above
reasons for Venezuela and Russia, this was also most importantly to push back, or
at least hold, “the strategic squeeze34 they ha[d] experienced during the Bush
administration” and to protect their interests increasingly eroded by the Bush regime
(Chuang, 2008: 15). W. Alejandro Sanchez ably describes comprehensively what

34

For Russia, this strategic squeeze was “a response to aggressive American actions worldwide, not just in
Latin America. Threatened by the missile defense system the United States is deploying in Eastern Europe,
Russia seeks to make the United States equally uncomfortable in its own backyard. Venezuela seems to be the
best place to start” (Chuang, 2008: 15).
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this Russia/Latin America interaction looks like, “a combination of an aggressive
Russia foreign policy focusing on diplomacy, trade and military sales and the rise of
anti-Washington governments in LATAM, who favour gaining extra-hemispheric
allies” and in which the U.S. is steadily losing influence due to the “lack of a
consistent and constructive foreign policy towards the region” (Sanchez, 2015: 362).

CHINA

In Latin America’s past, present, and very likely future, China has become yet
another variable upsetting the bandwagon of hegemonic tradition (i.e., Lars Schoultz
talks of ‘hegemony creep’ and “preventive hegemony”) in which Latin America was
seen as the U.S.A.’s “backyard” but also, just perhaps, changing one of the more
pernicious and hidden explanations of U.S. policy “in a process that blends selfinterest with what the Victorian British called their White Man’s Burden…a process
by which a superior people help a weaker civilization overcome the pernicious
effects of its sad defect” (Schoultz, 1998: xiv, xvi). Instead of the United States of
America, or another developed country and most likely former colonialist overseer,
China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and “lending more
than $100 billion to Latin America since 2005” and promising to “invest $250 billion
more in the region” from 2015 to 2035 which “trumps the combined regional lending
of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. Export-Import
Bank” (Kaplan, 2015: 1).
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On top of the over ten years of growing investment from China to Latin
America from at least 2005 until the present, there are always further investments
and ties. A potentially momentous example of the growing investment and ties
between China and Latin America is the second round of meetings of the Chinese
government and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
confirming and elaborating on the first round of meetings in January 2015 during
which an “investment deal worth some US$50 billion, in areas ranging from energy
to scientific research[, and] as well as “deepen[ing] trade and other political and
economic ties” was signed and would take place over a four-year span (teleSur Latin
America and China, 2015). Of course, other than the enormous potential of this
investment deal and the benefits in many economic, scientific, and other areas, it
also showcases another autonomous politically focused organization, CELAC, of
Latin America that is yet another very significant example of Latin America’s states
politically integrating in ways that are not supported or approved by the U.S. and
which explicitly exclude the U.S. and other developed countries of the Northern
world (De La Barra and Dello Buono, 2012: 32-33).
Apart from China and Latin America bilateral dealings, China is also further
involved along with its co-member states in BRICS, far from just a forum for
communicating internally by the member countries in 2014 it concretized institutional
tools like their New Development Bank (NDB) as an alternative to global Northern
institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and other financial institutions with initial
member investments of 50 billion and a planned additional “USD 100 billion liquidity
reserve fund” (PTI BRICS Bank to Fund, 2015; PTI BRICS Bank to Issue, 2015). In
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January of 2015, in the space of about two weeks during that month, China made
agreements with both Venezuela and Ecuador to invest 20 billion dollars in
Venezuela and 7.5 billion dollars in Ecuador (Al Jazeera To Invest, 2015).
Moreover, countries throughout Latin America that “have struggled to acquire
lending from global capital markets like the World Bank, or private capital markets,
have often found a willing partner in China” at the very least funneled “development
funds to places that otherwise would be cash-strapped and stricken” (Gustafson,
2016).
Political events in the U.S.A. such as the national election of November 2016
and the victory of a demagogue, bombastic, iconoclastic, and unexpected, the figure
of Donald J. Trump has in the opinion of more than one commentator offered only a
“negative agenda” of “anti-trade, anti-immigration” to Latin America as his current
statements show in abundance “China will fill the void and gain even more influence
in the region” (Oppenheimer, 2016). Precisely because of the “lack of attention” that
free trade and neoliberally inclined ideologues such as Oppenheimer bemoan of the
U.S. to Latin America in recent decades, set to increase through the stated
isolationist tendencies of Trump, the U.S. is only accelerating its “decline of
American power” globally and simultaneously providing the means of Latin
America’s to collectively free themselves “from Western imperialism” (Chomsky,
2016).
However, even if it is clear the vast amounts of financial and other resources
that are being provided to Latin America by China what is much less clear is if these
resources come with ulterior requirements or if the increasingly huge sums of trade
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and resources are making Latin America less or more dependent and politically
autonomous of the United States, China, and other Great Powers? As many
analysts have noted, the vast amount of loans, foreign direct investment, and other
resources and agreements that China is making with countries throughout Latin
America (by many accounts much more even than other regions of Chinese interest
like Africa) do not, of course, come without cost. Instead, typically, “repayments to
China are guaranteed by long-term commodity sales, which means a commitment to
push ahead with resource exploitation – often with dire consequences for the
environment and indigenous communities” (Watts, 2013). For instance, Chinese
investment has largely focused on “short-sighted natural resource exploitation” and
led to a “recommodification of the region’s exports as more and more attention has
been lavished on the selling of unfinished products and natural resources”
(Gustafson, 2016).
In fact, one scholar declares that “Chinese projects have often been largely
exploitative and unsustainable” (Gustafson, 2016). Even tremendous Chinese
investment in infrastructural development within the countries it is involved with has
been continually questioned and dismissed as only “designed merely to facilitate its
access to a particular natural resource deposit rather than the public good”
(Gustafson, 2016). Each potential benefit of Chinese investment has been undercut
and attacked at every turn. For example, the significant possibility of creating
endogenous jobs for huge Chinese projects (in the case of the planned Nicaraguan
canal fully 10% of the entire population of Nicaragua) has often not resulted in an
uptick in in-country employment, but instead, jobs have gone to “Chinese and other

93 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

foreigners” and joint infrastructural projects are conditioned on “Chinese workers and
Chinese equipment” (Gustafson, 2016; Shipley, 2015).
The lack of a beneficial increase in endogenous employment for Latin
American workers living around Chinese enterprises in-country is compounded by a
deep “cultural divide” characterized by “simplistic and unhelpful stereotypes
dominating on both sides” between Chinese managers and workers and the Latin
American’s which are their hosts (Watson, 2015). There is also the example of a
satellite tracking facility being built in the Patagonian region of Argentina, which the
author purports “will be staffed by the Chinese, and Argentinians themselves will
have only extremely limited access to it” (Coyer, 2016).
Not only are the costs of Chinese investment and trade with Latin America
fraught with potential pitfalls but according to some Latin America’s yearning for
political, economic, etc. autonomy from the United States and other Great Power
domination might instead be replaced with a new but altogether similar dependency
on Chinese largesse (Watts, 2013).
Of course, dependency is one of the main enemies and “albatrosses” around
the “neck” of Latin America from Bolivar’s first yearnings towards autonomy for the
region and so any form or degree of same such by Latin America towards any other
outside power would simply be renewing this cycle…or would it...? Could, for
instance, Latin America modulate/re-direct Chinese as well as other outside powers
(and we are thinking specifically of those powers outside of Latin America that are
nominally at least outside of the global hegemony of the reigning hegemon the
United States of America and its sycophants at this time) and leverage what support
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they might provide in the way that leaders like Tito in the former Yugoslavia and
Nehru in India might have balanced the Cold War sides of the U.S.A. representing
the West and the Soviet Union representing the East against each other to further
themselves and the respective countries that they led (Berger, 2004: 14). Whether
or not Latin America can cohere sufficiently through its regional organizations to
follow the Tito/Non-Aligned Movement example, or even if this is still possible or
optimal in a predominantly unipolar world, remains to be seen.35
Of course, all of the preceding said about China’s financial incursions into
Latin America, and first and foremost, the regional hegemon, Brazil, does not come
without its detractors in academia. One such detractor, who after study of “Chinese
foreign direct investment and loan/aid data” within the region declares that
compelling evidence “that China’s economic activity in Latin America is overstated in
comparison to the sustained economic commitments of other, more traditional
foreign actors in the region” and that any assertions to the contrary stating
something along the lines of China’s economic prowess and danger in region’s such
as Latin America are “toxic discourse” which perpetuates is
“dangerous…misinformation” (Narins, 2016: 36).
However, as tentative as this soft balancing might be by Latin America using
their newfound leverage provided by China to adjust the scales of their power,
international political flexibility, etc. with the United States of America this hegemonic
attenuation has certainly been evident to those who closely watch international
relations between these world players. Aside from the new levers of status and soft

35

Perhaps with some cracks in the façade by other world powers such as Russia and China repeatedly
declaring their support of and works towards a multipolar world (Blank and Kim, 2015: 162).
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power that Chinese investment has provided Latin American governments it is
important to note that apart from the immense suction of natural resources from the
Latin American region and the consequent environmental despoiling, potential
dependent relationships created, etc. that there are many other factors to consider
about China’s involvement in Latin America.
China likewise lays out its contra-hegemonic intentions in its recently
published its Defense White Paper of Chinese Military Strategy which clearly
declares first and foremost that China will, “unswervingly follow the path of peaceful
development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense
policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all
forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion” (MND-PRC, 2015).

CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, I have analyzed the extra-hegemonic and counterhegemonic potential that might be a phenomenon in Latin America at this recent
historical moment of the past two decades. I have studied the collective BRICS as
well as Russia and China’s political interventions and influence within Latin America,
and if these interactions are shifting the international affairs/foreign policy decisions,
room to maneuver, on whether these interactions are reproducing the traditional
subordination of Latin America to the United States or are introducing factors which
create some new “elbow room” for Latin America to take advantage of the distraction
of the reigning hegemon stretched as it is in many foreign policy entanglements

96 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

throughout the “Middle East” (Syria, Turkey, the refugee crises, terrorist attacks),
terrorist attacks in Western Europe, Eastern Europe (Ukraine) coups and civil war,
etc. (of course many of these things are debatably caused by their actions or
inaction) is always striving to bend the world to its interests and objectives. The
answers to several of these questions are necessarily speculative at this point since
my investigation is still in its early stages pending further study; however, I will
attempt to offer some preliminary results.
In the BRICS section of this chapter, I laid out the paradoxical and
contradictory background of the organization questioning its emancipatory potential
(i.e., towards supporting the political autonomy of the global South) with the many
incontrovertible facts of its existence including its origin coming about in part due to
the ruminations and selling of a Goldman Sachs banker and the attempted
matchmaking/invitation to a “seat at the global elites lesser table” of the G8. Add to
this that the BRICS most prominent members are Brazil, Russia, China, and India all
ostensibly still developing nations and also members of the global South on the one
hand and on the other hand countries arguably on the cusp of rising/emerging on the
way to “great power” status or in the case of Russia a strange amalgamation of a
“traditional European great power, which was also a military superpower during the
cold war,” and is sometimes called an ‘outdated great power’ (Acharya, 2014: 5960).
In the case of Brazil, we see a country which is considered a hegemon over
“its” region of the world by many observers within and without Latin America and the
Caribbean, which seeks to be a great power with large amounts of soft power
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through serving as a diplomatic intermediary intra-LATAM and the Caribbean
conflicts as well as in external conflicts such as Israel versus Palestine. Brazil is an
instrumental and lynchpin member of the BRICS and supporter/funder of many
projects supporting the supposed political, energy, etc. independence LATAM and
the Caribbean from U.S. hegemony through their co-founding of institutions and
regional organizations such as UNASUR and the BRICS Development Bank but at
the same time supports the United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti
(UNSTAMIH) a.k.a. Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haïti
(MINUSTAH)36 , which began in Haiti ostensibly as a protector of Haitian civilians
against coup government excesses but instead “helped facilitate political violence”
(Cohn, 2015; Sanchez, 2012: 161-162; Draitser, 2016).
However, considering all of the contradictions and potential negatives against
counter-hegemonic movements, the positive column ledger is also significant. For
instance, the cohesion showed by the virtually coordinated U.N. voting behavior of
the BRICS “vot[ing] the same way as each other at least 70% of the time, while they
vote the opposite way to the USA at least half the time” and thus “suggest[ing] a
different conception of the purpose, role, and practice of diplomacy at the UN held
by BRICS from that of the USA, France, and the UK” (Ferdinand, 2014: 380).
Thus far, it seems that ALBA-TCP was created as a response to the FTAA
and was instrumental in mobilizing and focusing broad opposition among the people
of Latin America and the groups that directly represented them “including
indigenous, labor, student, environmental, and women’s movements, as well as

3636

This is not to mention the tremendous but largely unnoticed (i.e. within Brazil) problem of “police-related
homicides” (Vigna, 2015).
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sympathetic NGOs and others” (López and Mc Donagh, 2016). However, ALBATCP does not seem to have been the linchpin leading to the demise of the FTAA,
but only one international actor, among many others. From my study thus far of
BRICS Joint Statements, BRICS Parliamentarian’s, and individual BRICS leaders
statements, and purely from the fact that the first meetings as BRIC and later BRICS
began at the earliest in 2006 one year on from the demise of the FTAA, I can say
with relative sureness that the BRICS were not very significant or even apparent in
any sense pro or con versus the FTAA.

CHAPTER 4:
CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING POSSIBILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

For a brief time in Latin America37, the possibilities seemed endless, the
horizon infinite and getting brighter all of the time. LATAM was no longer the
exploited and tortured suffering region portrayed38 in the Open Veins of Latin
America. Still, a newly reinvigorated, re-emboldened, and even a strong and unified
hemisphere just then emerging from the “dark times”39 of military dictatorships, coup
d’états, mass disappearances of civilians/“dissidents,” and neoliberal economic

37

The past two decades period which I focus on in throughout my thesis.
Though this was only one part of Galeano’s poetical and emotional narrative.
39
In addition to the above atrocities, these dark times included widespread crimes against humanity
(kidnapping and torture of mothers and seizure of their children to the associates and “deserving” portion of
the population friendly or preferred by coup shock troops), oppression of those already poverty-stricken and
marginalized masses, and the economic side of these apocalyptic times which was brutal austerity,
exploitation of these same masses in perpetuating the “resource curse” through forcing these families into
extraction of natural resources, destruction of labor unions and anyone who even hinted at dissension from
these ruinous courses of action (Blum, 1995: 214, 229, 235; Mitchell 2011: 19-21).
38
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“shock therapy”40 imposed region-wide the United States allied governments in
countries throughout the area.
For the first time in a very long while, LATAM were newly asserting their
political and economic sovereignty and autonomy from their traditional U.S.
overseers. Venezuela invited the Russian military into their airports and naval ports
for the first time in over three decades for joint military exercises and a way to firmly
and boldly signal their independence from the U.S. and in their foreign policymaking.
Venezuela and many other countries in the region allied with another rising power,
China, in increasingly massive and important trade, infrastructure, etc. deals again,
signaling their political and economic autonomy.
During the “Pink Tide” in Latin America, the national economies of countries
throughout the region were also in the “boom” times benefiting from very high
commodity prices of exportable natural and other resources from oil (Venezuela and
Mexico), soybeans (Brazil and Argentina), to lithium (Bolivia, Chile, Argentina) (Ash,
2017; Workman, 2017). Politically left-of-center LATAM governments were
increasingly being democratically elected (with many instituting much more
progressive constitutions, participatory democracy, etc. than previous governments)
with presidents vociferous in their opposition to U.S. “neo-imperialism,” political and
economic prescriptions, and strongly supporting multi-polar global governance

40

“Governments embarked upon massive economic restructuring and the privatization of natural resources,
selling off the national patrimony (including public services and utilities) to domestic and international capital,
and opening up previously protected sectors (notably agriculture) to competition from the industrialized
producers of North America” all in an political environment in which the “right-wing forces” or “governments,
political parties, think tanks, corporations, religious institutions and the media, all of which overwhelmingly
and enthusiastically embraced neoliberalism” and “aimed to block movements for redistributory and socially
just reforms (Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlam, 2011: 93; Klein, 2007: 4-5).
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instead of U.S. led unipolarity through increasing alliances outside of the U.S. such
as Russia and China, and overall “some of the most interesting and progressive
experiments in the conduct of political economy have been taking place [and] novel
strategies of economic, social, and political development are being explored in the
aftermath of long decades of neo-liberalism” (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 3335, 60-61, 87; Vivares 2014: xiii).
U.S. dominated regional organizations such as the O.A.S., and the World
Bank and I.M.F. were steadily spurned in favor of newly created organizations such
as ALBA-TCP, UNASUR, CELAC, and the BRICS Development Bank that explicitly
excluded the U.S. in favor of LATAM states, and often charted vastly different
political and economic systems and methods than that of neoconservative and
neoliberal predominant organizations and systems of the past. The “old ways” of
doing things in LATAM were continuously acknowledged, debated, and often done
away with by these governments in favor of progressive innovations, and all of this
not only grounded but led by mass popular support41.
At the same time, for almost as long as there has been a politically leftward
shift in Latin America the United States hegemonic attentions and intentions have
been daily distracted by “economic and security crises in the Middle East and
Europe” instead of simultaneously pandering and dominating Latin America and the
Caribbean in one hand and in the other completing their pivot to Asia (Daalder,

41

It is interesting to note here that academic and journalistic (particularly those media organizations
controlled by corporations) analysis often dismiss the relevance and significance of autonomous LATAM
regional organizations when they even deign to mention them. However, taking no note of this dismissiveness
themselves neither did LATAM regional organizations or events in the region limit themselves to neoliberal,
neoconservative, and hegemonic proscriptions of the amassed Northern media/government forces arrayed
against them.
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2016). Notwithstanding these blazes happen with such frequency and the likelihood
of blowing back and exploding into the much larger region and even global spanning
conflagrations, the U.S. continues to flail in its search of “full-spectrum dominance”
of all its international problems and “threats” (Council, 2009). Thus the U.S. has
largely had all of its military and economic attentions monopolized by geopolitical
flare-ups at the expense of maintaining firm control of its usual national subordinates
in its customary hemispheric influence.
Latin American politicians noted this loosening of the hegemonic ties that
bound them and the simultaneous long-held opinion of their constituents towards
greater political and economic integration of the region that would presumably
materially benefit them through the creation of a greater and stronger united bloc.
Consequently, there were some tremendous shifts and changes to more
participatory democracy and economics, which increased the implementation of
social welfare within many of the countries at the forefront of this leftward shift.
On the other hand, these shifts within the region towards social development
and the reduction of poverty while counter-hegemonic in their ways have not always
been universally condemned and stifled at every turn by the hegemonic powers that
be in fact with certain examples they have been readily accepted and even feted.
For instance, the Brazilian model of poverty reduction and socio-economic
amelioration implemented by President Lula da Silva called Bolsa Familia or the
“conditional cash transfer program through which parents receive a fixed monthly
stipend…in exchange for sending their children to school and complying with
different health checkups” and which has “managed to reduce poverty by half in
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Brazil…some 50 million low-income Brazilians, or a quarter of the total population”
and in this case (unlike the Complementary Economic Zone) received the praise of
the political and economic masters of the day as the “market-friendly way to fight
inequality” of such establishment and neoliberal bastions like the World Bank and
Foreign Affairs Magazine (Muhr, 2014: 9; Tepperman, 2016; Wetzel, 2014).
No matter if some of the “innovative examples” of a resurgent Latin America
were accepted with arms wide open or countered at every turn, there were always
challenges, and perhaps these challenges often seem insurmountable. Without
question, integrating individuals is very hard, joining municipalities more so, and
integrating continentally or hemispherically located states perhaps as difficult as
aerospace engineering. Considering the lack of examples of region-wide “united
states,”42 the level of difficulty signified by this analogy seems apt (Parent, 2011: 2).
Certainly, academia and the news media never seem to tire of gleefully
pointing out the difficulties of political, social, economic, etc. integration among
states, and not many examples are as rich with material for these critiques as Latin
America. These difficulties are evident, from “the unique geography of the area”
(e.g., continental topography in South America which includes huge mountain
ranges like the Andes, earthquakes, flooding, mudslides, the impossibility of building
quick and efficient infrastructure through the Amazon Rainforest), to the heavyhandedness and “unfair” implementation by those leaders "selling" integration and
their conflicting and uncompromising state interests, to inter-state squabbles over

42

Whether this is in a federation, confederation, or some other form.

103 | P a g e

Engines of Autonomy

D. Bajic

borders/territory which are legacies of post-liberation civil wars (COHA Great Barrier,
2009; Parent, 2011: 116-117, 120, 126-128; BBC News Peru and Chile, 2015).
In recent years the difficulties are reappearing in force as Latin America is in
the midst of a “perfect storm” of political and economic tumult (brought on in part by
these same convulsions worldwide, partly through active subversion led by the
United States and its allies, and partly through festering systemic problems never
adequately addressed) signaling a return to a deep trough in its development and
integration from its period of heady highs. From the ongoing crises (economic,
political, etc.)43 in Venezuela after President Chavez’ death in 2013, to the faltering
economies and struggling currencies throughout Latin America, to the return of the
right in many of the countries previously headed by leaders of a more leftist political
persuasion often through less than electoral or constitutional means, to natural and
environmental calamities brought on partly by global warming and partly by
governmental and societal policies and practices, no matter where you peer the
outlook seems dark and oppressive with not much hope for a turnaround any time
soon (BBC – Bolivia, 2016; Bolton, 2016; Gonzalez, 2016; West, 2016).
Of course, these economic “boom” times could not last forever. The
tremendous reduction in commodity prices coupled with a variety of other factors
such as economic “slowdowns” in China (and other non-economic factors such as
the aforementioned death of Chavez, overthrow or changing of governments from
left-of-center to the right in Honduras, Paraguay, and Brazil, etc.) all combined to

43

One may disagree with causes of these crises or even to their degree as compared to always hyperbolic and
negative press by the corporate media domestically and internationally.
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add pressure to governments within Latin America and the erosion of the previously
ascendant “Pink Tide.”
It is important here to recognize that this observation of Latin American
governments (esp. that left-of-center) was “riding the boom” (and to a better extent –
than previous rightist governments – distributing these windfalls to the general
population) but remained significantly dependent on these extractive commodities
and such reproducing age-old economic dependencies (Rojas and Sunkara, 2017).
This same commenter further acknowledges that the social welfare (“social
democratic”) universal programs were put into place by these Pink Tide
governments seeking the continued approval of the new constituencies that had
elected and continued to support them against previous constituencies (the elites in
each country). They did not otherwise really have the time, wherewithal, etc. to
make lasting structural changes to the economic framework in place from various
colonialist overseers to the present capitalist/neoliberal globalization (Rojas and
Sunkara, 2017).
My hypothesis from the beginning of this paper has been to look at the rise of
these at one time ascendant governments, renewed impetus towards regional
integration, and regional organizations consolidating and solidifying this integrationist
push as something qualitatively different than previous times and projects somehow
independent of the states that spurred these latest regional initiatives. However, my
study of various cases such as base deals between Colombia and the United States
and the Colombian bombing of Ecuador, to the BRICS and more importantly the two
countries of the BRICS, China and Russia, newly ascendant worldwide and
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particularly in Latin America, and most importantly the past several years full of turns
away from regional integration and Pink Tide.
It is a time of worldwide political tumult. At the time of this writing, there have
been major protests throughout Latin America in the past several weeks and months
from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador, with earlier protests from Honduras and
Nicaragua to Venezuela. The protests and tumult in Argentina, Bolivia, and arguably
Ecuador all signal major discontent with the ruling government, and at least in
Argentina and Bolivia come at the time of presidential elections, which could result in
dramatic shifts in government. The mass demonstrations and societal strife in
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador are all against governments that are either rightist or rightof-center in political orientation and took power on the coattails of the Pink Tide. At
the same time, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela all still have leftist or left-of-center
governments. One article sums up the demonstrations throughout Latin American
and the Caribbean as “people are rising against right-wing, US-backed governments
and their neoliberal austerity policies” (Koerner, 2019).
As the article above states, most of the recent uprisings and civil disturbances
have in common is a repudiation of the “neoliberal austerity policies” and “right-wing,
US-backed governments” foisted on those countries that elected44 governments of
this nature in response to a downturn in the Pink Tide. The return of rightist (or
corporatist, elitist, etc.) governments general turmoil, overall intra-conflict, and
increasing obscurity and irrelevance of the still-nascent counter-hegemonic regional

44

In many cases throughout current and past Latin-American and Caribbean governments of this rightist and
neoliberal nature such as Brazil and Honduras the term election needs to come with many disclaimers as both
came in the aftermath of an outright coup d'état as in Honduras and an impeachment as in Brazil and later
jailing of the most popular and prominent presidential candidate.
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organizations have led me to the unavoidable conclusion of the irrevocably state-led
nature of these regional organizations and counter-hegemonic and integrationist
projects wafting away like so many ephemeral wisps of smoke.
At the same time, the durability and significance of China and Russia, and to
a lesser extent, the larger global South’s influence in Latin America, cannot be
denied and reinforces the state-led nature of most regional integration within
LATAM. China and Russia are truly new international power players vying against
United States interests in their soft-balancing but already long-lasting and impactful
ways. Within South America, Venezuela is the country that is furthest from
America’s sphere of influence, and the strongest likelihood of resisting the U.S.
dictates beginning with the election of President Hugo Chavez in 1998 and his
presidential tenure from 1999 until his death in 2013.
Against the U.S.’s intents, even America’s most rightist and hawkish think
tanks such as the Heritage Foundation in their annual report on the U.S. military
have, for years, have had to acknowledge China and Russia’s rarely before seen
heights of power. In the Heritage Foundation’s report, Russia and China are at the
very uppermost of their listing and gradations of threats and their capabilities steadily
improving while the U.S. military capacities to counter these challenges remained
steadily diminishing (Mehta and Gould, 2019). In at least the past decade, the
actions and continued policies of concurrent American presidents Obama and
Trump the sanctioning, punishing, and isolating measures and continued
encirclement and enlargement of U.S. military bases and military involvement
abroad attempting to constrain China and Russia has instead of constraining them
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have ostensibly led to a strengthening of their diplomatic, military, economic, etc.
cross-state ties.
One of the major media outlets within the U.S., CNBC, recently reported that
military ties between Russia and China had taken a “leap forward” with Russia’s
intent to help China build a “system to warn against ballistic missile launches” (Reid,
2019). Earlier the same year as the collaboration over the ballistic missile launch
system was Turkey’s decision to go ahead with delivery of the S-400, the most
advanced and sought-after Russian-made air defense system (Mehta, 2019).
American foreign policy since the election of President Trump in 2016 is a
perplexing and chaotic mixture of bluster, bombast, brinkmanship, effusive praise
(offers of blank checks and overflowing coffers) or vehement and unhinged
vituperation (total annihilation by military strikes depending on the minute or day) of
world leaders and powerful rivals of the U.S. state, foreign policy and state secrets
via Twitter/tweet, and military strikes and military use abroad via uninformed and
mercurial presidential fiat. However, relatively consistent throughout this mishmash
has been the steady distancing of the United States from even the hint of closer ties
with China and Russia, which are increasingly viewed as definite great power rivals
(Lu, 2019).
By now, it should be clear who the closest great power competitors of the
United States of America are, as is clear by the criteria which we already set forth.
Both China and Russia have very clear military, national, and international policy
and strategy documents setting forth one of their core state interests as political
autonomy from the U.S.A. Both Russia and China’s membership within the BRICS
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and their close bilateral ties with countries throughout South America, which also are
clear in their intent to grow autonomy from the U.S., and particularly the ability to
resist economic sanctions and political instability perpetrated by U.S. efforts to effect
governmental/political change in targeted countries, and Russia and China’s
involvements and alliances within South America both considerably bolster those
countries in Latin America that are working towards political autonomy from the
traditional hegemon the U.S. in this goal.
The second point of our established criteria is that at least one state within a
regional organization that desires autonomy from the U.S. and has some power to
resist U.S. power on its own. Russia and China again definitely fulfill these last
points in their BRICS membership as well as in their close ties to many countries
within Latin America.
What has carried through from the dissipation of the Pink Tide has been the
people power that has always been there and only awaiting the right stimulus. The
stimulus has come in the oligarchic imposition of austerity for the poor. With the
continuing and growing protests in Chile and past demonstrations and uprisings in
Ecuador and Argentina (among other significant political-social movement events
and countries), there is a visceral and mass fury against economic and political
austerity/neoliberalism/hegemony imposed by the U.S. via its willing political
subordinates and functionaries within top governmental positions. Chile’s mass
demonstrations of over a million people in one city have so far resulted in the
rollback of all public transportation increases as well as a raft of planned new
legislation in an attempt to appease the masses demands in the streets as well as
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many of the president’s cabinet being replaced. Additionally, in the wake of the
mass uprisings and the accompanying brutality and atrocities committed by police
and the military and over twenty-two people killed the demands have moved far
beyond what has already been offered by the president and people are now
organizing in local assemblies across the country to push for a Constitutional
Assembly and re-founding of the country with the full participation of the citizenry
(the current Constitution was written during the Pinochet dictatorship) and the
resignation of the president (Cuffe, 2019).
And yet, with all the difficulties well known for over a century by policymakers,
this idea still has intellectual and emotional traction and cache unlike few others
within the Latin American imagination. Even outside of the very well-known
“liberation” of much of South America from Spanish occupation through the actions
of Simón Bolívar, there is also the example of Francisco Morazán a temporal and
revolutionary peer of Bolívar. In the poetical description of Eduardo Galeano
Francisco Morazán “fought” to unite the disparate and fractious countries of Central
America (where the countries “alternately ignore and mistreat one another”) into a
“single republic” in which he turned “convents into schools and hospitals” over his
eight years in power before his eventual overthrow by the “Church” and associated
elites that set the stage for invasion by [North] American William Walker (Galeano,
2009: 204).
From Latin America’s past to its future, the struggle towards autonomous
regional integration continues. At the time of this writing there has been over a
decade of “new forms of governance, economic restructuring, and social
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mobilization…responding to and at times challenging the continuing hegemony” of
the ‘neoliberal world order’ in stalwarts and regional leaders of the “New” Latin
American Left like Venezuela and Bolivia.
Under past left-of-center of traditional regional hegemons like “Left-of-Center”
Brazil and Argentina playing cautious and unlikely sometimes “anti-imperialist” allies
and more often “herders” of Latin American opinion and diplomatic suasion/sway
regionally, bilaterally, and internationally and usually regional mundane and
reactionary recalcitrants such as Paraguay and Uruguay45 both seeing relativelyspeaking seismic shifts politically leftward and regionally closer to the rest of the
“Pink Tide” (Goodale and Postero, 2013: 1; Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes, 2013: 2). In
the current day, many of these Left political gains supporting regional political
integration have been eroded or are in the process of being rolled back or otherwise
stymied. However, the changes in government are always in flux, as can be seen in
the recent elections in Argentina returning government the left-of-center after one
term of the right-of-center oligarchy and developments in Chile still ongoing and
unpredictable.
There have been massive shifts in economic and political investment by
governments of the “Pink Tide” into improving what has been defined as “millennium
development goals” or “sustainable development goals”46 by the United Nations and
away from previous neoliberal priorities “such as privatization, fiscal austerity,
deregulation, free trade, and reductions in government spending in order to enhance

45

The political changes/shifts in Paraguay and Uruguay have continued to wildly oscillate from the original
time of this writing and so this general leftward shift is no longer evident.
46
2016. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Millennium Development Goals.” http://bit.ly/2aiJY1B.
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the role of the private sector in the economy.”47 Of course, as with so much else
within this conclusion in many countries such as Argentina, Chile, and most notably
Brazil conditions within these countries have changed radically as has the leaders
elected in recent years that are in the process of rolling-back and attempting to
destroy any of these hard-fought changes that sought to benefit the poor and
middle-classes within these countries.
Throughout the post-Pink Tide and into the pre-Coronavirus pandemic,
current-day social movements have been resurgent busy mobilizing a million or
more people a day protesting “as the revolt of the dispossessed for a better world
against the barbarism of neoliberalism” (Harris, 2019). The social movements of
today in Latin America differ widely in everything from their counterparts in past
years. Today’s social movements are innovating in their “demands, identities,
repertories, and profile of the participants,” they are “multi- and pluri-class
movements” and they are increasingly transnational with an “alter- or antiglobalization vision” (Gohn, 2015: 361). Social movements may be defined in part
as being, “collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution
by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites,
opponents, and authorities [original emphasis]” or “an organized and sustained effort
of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups, and organizations, to promote or
to resist social change with the use of public protest activities” (Goodhart, 2007: 2-3).
Latin American social movements cover the full spectrum of focuses and
demands from land reform/farmland and food security for landless rural workers

47

2016. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Neoliberalism.” http://bit.ly/2a22YD9.
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movement in Brazil, to upholding a given lifestyle or identity such as many national
and transnational indigenous groups out of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, or
environmentalism (Gohn, 2015: 362;364). New technology has allowed the creation
of new virtual social movements such as a transnational coalition of rural
organizations that exist without either physical headquarters or a high-profile
organizing group (Gohn, 2015: 362). These new virtual social movements
organizing via social media have been prevalent in all the recent large protest
movements from Bolivia to Chile and Colombia.
From northern Mexico to southern Argentina, there has been ever-increasing
popular participation from the 1990s to the present day in social movements
throughout Latin America and transnationally (Almeida and Ulate, 2015: 3). These
social movements have been very diverse including 2007 street marches in Costa
Rica against the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the white
marches in El Salvador against health care privatization, and the black marches in
Panama against pension system reform, along with the massive indigenous
mobilizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru (Almeida and Ulate, 2015: 3). In
addition, there has been widespread mobilization against economic liberalization
policies throughout the early 2000s in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Almeida
and Ulate, 2015: 3).
Social movements that organize and advocate for indigenous communities
have been widespread in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Panama, and Peru (Almeida and Ulate, 2015: 3). Organizations have included
amongst their demands and foci “environmental[ism], feminist, gay/lesbian,and
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consumer identities” as well as the traditional labor unions and rural sectors
(Almeida and Ulate, 2015: 3). Most significantly for the thesis of my paper, the
“mass mobilizations are also directly linked to the rise of several left-leaning
governments in the region by converting street politics into successful electoral
outcomes” (Almeida and Ulate, 2015: 3).
Transnational/supranational social movements (TSM) may be affecting more
than just their states (where the members of the TSM’s originate) policies or
electoral outcomes but also sovereignty. According to Michael Goodhart, there are
a “vast empirical literature documents how [TSM] can influence policy and constrain
global governance…[and] promote norms of democracy and human rights…[that
are] good thing[s] [that have] positive effects on global governance” but there is very
little looking at TSM’s and sovereignty (whether the typical outside, inside or
popular) and if Latin American TSM’s maybe making a new form of autonomy
(Goodhart, 2007: 2-3, 6). If TSM’s can impact the autonomy of nation-states, one
way might be by “counterbalanc[ing] the ‘state-like’ system of global governance
made up of institutionalized regulatory arrangements (regimes) and less formalized
norms, rules and procedures” (Goodhart, 2007: 4).
The idea of TSM’s creating a form of autonomy in addition to or rather than
political elite led international organizations or the states they rule is very interesting
and promising for future research. However, returning from the brief analysis of
TSM’s potential for something other than unitary state-led or regional political
autonomy, my research throughout this paper have continually returned to the
centrality of state/political elite led counterhegemonic autonomy.
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The results of my study appear to show that the vehicle of autonomous
regional integration and security from United States domination will likely not be via
autonomous Latin American regional organizations (at least not solely) but maybe
with state-led region’s relationships with alternate world powers such as China and
Russia. One of the best opportunities for newly resurgent and strong Latin American
regional organizations to show a united front and assert their capacity to chart an
independent foreign, military, etc. policy versus the United States of America in the
case of the bombing of one of their members by a neighboring country (the
Colombian military bombing of Ecuador) or the proposed base deal between the
United States and Ecuador what opposition, coordinated diplomacy, etc. was
squandered as it was hidden from global and official view. The hidden and subdued
nature of regional integration in this historical moment as evidenced by the
statements from Latin American leaders attending regional summits and crisis
meetings and at the time releasing only the most diplomatic and cautious public
statements while prohibiting any media coverage of the actual negotiations. The
only reason we now know that statements of these same leaders behind closed
doors were vociferous and completely in agreement of the active role of the U.S. in
fanning the flames of conflict and internecine divisions was that these hidden
statements were revealed via leaked transcripts, documents, etc. years after the
conclusion of events.
The B.R.I.C.S. and other similar amalgamations of developing countries
allegedly demonstrating the counter-hegemonic potential and independent streaks
from the reigning world imperial hegemon was another test case I studied. Still,
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upon further investigation, the results were similarly contradictory and fractious. The
agglomerated and hastily assembled nature of the B.R.I.C.S. is evident from its
inception. Brazil, a regional hegemon like many of its co-member countries that
make up the B.R.I.C.S. at first glance seem to be torn between resisting the U.S. as
global hegemon by being a supporter/funder of many projects supporting the
supposed political, energy, etc. independence of LATAM and the Caribbean from
imperial hegemony through their founding of institutions and regional organizations
with counterhegemonic purposes and actions at the same time actively propping up
reactionary and oppressive groups such as the “peacekeeping” foreign forces acting
within Haiti.
However, on second glance, this is perfectly logical for Brazil as all these
seemingly countervailing actions simultaneously working with and against the U.S.
hegemon together add up to the rising hegemonic aspirations of Brazil, and all have
these interests and goals first and foremost from their founding to their
implementation. Of course, with the Temer48 government strongly supported by the
entire Brazilian National Congress and some further write that Rousseff’s
impeachment/removal from power was in fact, “not an isolated event: it was the
result of a coordinated maneuver to overthrow the Partido dos Trabalhadores
(Workers’ Party, PT) government—a plan carried out by the Brazilian mainstream
media and the country’s political and economic elites, with aid from the judiciary,” all
of this maneuvering by Brazil under the tenures of Lula and Rousseff is now
seriously in question (Piva and Muscarella, 2017).

48

As of this writing currently Jair Messias Bolsonaro government.
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There is a significant “constituent resistance to [the] conservative wave” away
from the Pink Tide shown by the growing and strengthening protests and other
resistance within Brazil and throughout Latin America. However, even if these
movements are successful in pressuring the levers of government to work against
these reactionaries leading their often ill-gained positions of power these same
governmental levers are still often held by those within the same institutions that
approved of seriously questionable or outright illegal governmental actions against
elected and popular leaders like Rousseff in Brazil or other countries, and not only
complicit in these unconstitutional actions but also directly threatened by any actions
they are pushed to take, making the outcomes oftentimes murky and grim (Piva and
Muscarella, 2017).
News out of Latin American in recent years post-Pink Tide seems more of a
dreary dystopia or a reminder of the unattainable dream of Bolivar. We have seen
country after country fell to the overwhelming economic, military, and other
resources wielded by an increasingly erratic and dangerous imperial hegemon and
its latest iteration holding the reins of power. However, even during this darkness, if
one looks hard enough, one can find silver linings in the most unexpected places.
For instance, the presidential term of Donald J. Trump, while reactionary and
regressive in most aspects, has been refreshing at least in removing any pretense
and flowery words over foreign policy, the reasons for the United States military
interventions, and presence around the world (Bennis, 2019). As Nelson Mandela
has related, during his early revolutionary days under apartheid, mobilizing people is
better when there is a clear enemy in power (Richman, 2013).
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However, though silver linings may be found the current regime in power in
Washington D.C. is certainly one of the worst in the historical record particularly for
its peopling of the administration’s functionaries as the worst of the worst in terms of
war criminals and other bad actors, its support and cozying up to dictators abroad,
and the brutality and virtually unrestricted use of the military (St. Clair, 2019).
With all of the tumult throughout the Latin American region and worldwide at
this time, it is no surprise that regional integration is the farthest thing from most
people’s minds. Certainly, the past few years have seen the gradual dissolution,
obscurity, or irrelevancy of most of the nominally counter-hegemonic organizations
in Latin America that arose during the Pink Tide. The mass demonstrations and
changes in government in Latin America that is mostly delayed reactions to ruinous
neoliberalism imposed (or re-imposed) after the Pink Tide and the just-announced
release from prison of Lula De Silva are more glimmers of light in the darkness.
My interest in Latin America and what would become my thesis began around
the beginning of what would later be labeled the “Pink Tide” or the rise of left-ofcenter governments throughout Latin America (but particularly in South America)
with the election of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in 1998 who would
become a firebrand and standard-bearer for this response to previous decades of
austerity, dictatorship, and domination. During this time, I was going through and
finishing my Bachelor’s and this Master’s. My political education had continued and
took a dramatic turn only a year after the election of President Chavez during the
1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Kosovo, Serbia, and the
surrounding areas during the “Kosovo War” as much of my family outside of my
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immediate relatives lived in Serbia and were directly impacted by the bombing.
Seeing and hearing the justifications for the bombing (unapproved by the United
Nations Security Council), public reactions, media coverage, etc. compared to what
my family was experiencing and coming at a formative period of my political
education all primed me to very much doubt official media narratives and national
government statements against what were deemed enemies of national geostrategic
interests by U.S. politicians and would color my curiosity and learning of Latin
America in subsequent years.
As news reports of political developments would trickle out of Latin America, I
became more and more interested and excited about what was happening there.
The real spur to my interest and my decision to major in International Studies in my
Bachelor’s and this Master’s was the brief coup against President Chavez removing
him as president on April 11, 2002, and reinstatement after mass protests against
the coup agents and for President Chavez on April 14, 2002.
As I learned and digested more about the complicated history of Latin
America I became aware of how Latin America was underdeveloped economically,
politically, etc. due to the manipulation and domination of world powers such as the
United States of America, Britain, etc. at least since Latin America’s liberation from
the control of Spain during the early 1800’s.
As I learned more about the region, including educational trips to Venezuela
and Bolivia in the early 2000’s, I became much more interested in how Latin America
was addressing the accumulated underdevelopment and what could be done in the
future in this regard. All of this was already in mind when I found out about the
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regional organizations of Latin America and how countries mostly in South America
were organizing and coordinating to further and faster push the development of the
region independent of the interests and desires of the great global powers.
I started to look for examples of political autonomy and subordination in South
America. Were there instances in the history of regional political sovereignty and
independence from the historic sway of the United States? Could regional
organizations or some other sources facilitate and engineer South American elites’
search for regional autonomy and solidarity as an alternative to Washington’s
Consensus agenda or more broadly subservience to hegemony? Working through
regional organizations and bloc politics could member states collectively stand
against the great powers and simultaneously fuel their development?
I sought to arrive at conclusions by studying the United States and South
American international relations and dynamics (e.g., perceived U.S. international
allies and enemies and influence of these allies-enemies in the region whether real
or perceived), and U.S. support and policymaking towards Latin America (e.g. “Plan
Colombia,” “counter-terrorism,” etc.). I learned that Latin Americans had been
desiring and working towards fighting their subservient position to the United States
of America and the political and socio-economic integration of their region since the
beginning of the area independent of foreign military occupation.
The results of my study have underlined the state-led nature of regional
integration in Latin America and the importance of great powers outside of the U.S.
orbit, such as Russia and China, in keeping Latin America afloat and gradually
further from U.S. domination. At the same time, the significance and power of
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people when united, awake, and active no matter the other forces arrayed against
them, cannot be denied.
“Every day, I feel greater strength in this project. I see that new leaders are
arising. And the day will come when they will not see me any longer because
I am not indispensable. There are those who say that if I disappear, this
whole project would crumble. But that is not true.”
President Hugo Chavez
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